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Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief
and Congress: Concurrent Power
over the Conduct of War
JULES LOBEL*

The Bush Administration has asserted that the President has broad and
exclusive power to conduct its war on terror under the Constitution as
Commander in Chief. In doing so the Administration ignores or greatly
minimizes Congress's constitutional powers to "declare war," "grant Letters
of Marque and Reprisal," "make Rules concerning Captures on Land and
Water," "raise and support Armies," "provide and maintain a Navy," "make
Rules for Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," and
other express powers such as the Necessary and Proper Clause.1
The Bush Administration argues that the Commander in Chief has
exclusive power to decide what military tactics to use to defeat a wartime
enemy, and construes the term "tactics" very broadly. Several examples
illustrate the broad Presidential powers claimed by the Administration:
* Administration officials have contended that "Congress may no more
regulate the President's ability to detain and interrogate enemy combatants
'2
than it may regulate his ability to direct troop movements on the battlefield."
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh Law School. I want to thank my
colleagues at the Law School for their thoughtful comments on this Article at a
University of Pittsburgh Law School colloquium, and the participants of faculty
workshops and colloquia at Stanford Law School and Chicago-Kent Law School for their
insightful comments. I particularly want to thank Rhonda Wasserman, David Adler, Bill
Luneburg, Ruth Colker, Van Beck Hall, Harold Krent, George Loewenstein, Michael
Heilman and Leslie Heilman for their helpful comments. The University of Pittsburgh
Law School Document Technology Center was incredibly helpful in their preparation of
this Article. Dean Mary Crossley of the University of Pittsburgh Law School generously
supported this project with summer stipend funds. Finally, I want to especially thank Law
Librarians Linda Tashbook and Marc Silverman, my research assistants Lisl Brunner,
Lauren Miller, and Christopher Strayer for their research on this Article, and my wife
Karen Engro for all her support while I was writing it.
1U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-14, 18.
2 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for
Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, at 35 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.texscience.org/reform/torture/bybee-olc-torture- 1aug02.pdf.
The
Justice
Department subsequently withdrew that claim as "unnecessary" but never repudiated it.
Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., to James B. Comey,
Deputy Att'y Gen., Re: Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, at
1 (Dec. 30, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/18usc23402340a2. htm, and a
2005 presidential signing statement stated that the Executive branch would interpret the
McCain Amendment's prohibition on cruel and inhumane interrogations of detainees "in
a manner consistent with the President's constitutional authority ... as Commander in
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* The Administration has also claimed that Congress lacks
constitutional authority to prohibit the government's warrantless wiretapping
program because it is an important intelligence gathering tactic in the
3
government's war against terrorism.
* In perhaps the clearest and most sweeping statement of the
President's authority, the Department of Defense's Working Group Report
on Detainee Interrogation in 2003 states "in wartime, it is for the President
4
alone to decide what methods to use to best prevail against the enemy."
* President Bush has even asserted that Congress does not have the
power to limit or wind down the Iraq war, stating, "I don't think Congress
5
ought to be running the war."
* President Bush vetoed the 2007 Iraq supplemental appropriations
bill, which would have required that the President begin withdrawing troops
by July 1 under certain circumstances, asserting that "[t]his legislation is
unconstitutional because it purports to direct the conduct of the operations of
the war in a way that infringes upon the powers vested in the Presidency by
'6
the Constitution, including as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces."
Many have criticized the Bush Administration's invocation of expansive
Presidential war powers to interrogate prisoners, 7 engage in warrantless
Chief." President's Statement on H.R. 2863, Department of Defense, Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and
Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DoC. 1918 (Dec. 30, 2005). As
a senior Administration official later explained, the signing statement was intended to
reserve the President's constitutional right to use harsh interrogation methods "in special
situations involving national security" despite the congressional ban. Charlie Savage,
Bush Could Bypass New Torture Ban, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 4, 2006, at Al.
3 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIvrTIES OF THE
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT 3 (Jan. 19, 2006), reprinted

in
81
IND.
L.J.
1374,
1376
(2006),
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf

also
available
at
[hereinafter
LEGAL

AUTHORITIES].
4 U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS
IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL, POLICY AND

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 24 (2003) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB 127/03.04.04.pdf.
5 Adam Cohen, Just What the Founders Feared: An Imperial President Goes to
War, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2007, at A22.
6
H.R. Doc. No. 110-31 (Veto Message from the President) at 153 CONG. REC.
H4315. Stuart Taylor, Jr., The President's War Powers, NEWSWEEK, May 7, 2007,
availableat http://www.newsweek.com/id/34860.
7 See DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA IS LOSING

THE WAR ON TERROR 62-63 (2007); Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., & Robert B. Shaw,
Assessing the Constitutionality of the National Security Agency's Warrantless
Wiretapping Program: Exit the Rule of Law, 17 J. LAW & PUB. POL'Y 429, 466-68
(2006); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assault on the Constitution, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1,
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wiretapping of American citizens, or conduct the Iraq war. 8 However, few of
those critics have challenged the Administration's initial premise-that the
Constitution gives the President as Commander-in-Chief unbridled power
over battlefield tactical decisions in the conduct of war.
This Article, however, challenges that assumption and will demonstrate
that it is not supported by the Constitution, history, or logic. Congress and the
President have concurrent power to conduct warfare that has been authorized
by Congress. Congress maintains the ultimate authority to decide the
methods by which the United States will wage war. The President can direct
and manage warfare, however, the only Commander in Chief power that
Congress cannot override is the President's power to command: to be, in
Alexander Hamilton's words, the nation's "first General and Admiral." 9
The Administration's position that it has exclusive power over tactical or
battlefield operations finds some support in legal scholarship and Supreme
Court dicta. In his 1866 concurring opinion in Ex parte Milligan, Chief
Justice Salmon P. Chase observed that Congress could not enact legislation
that "interferes with the command of the forces or the conduct of campaigns.
That power and duty belongs to the President as commander-in-chief."' 0
Chase's dictum that Congress "cannot direct the conduct of campaigns" was
repeated by the Supreme Court two years ago in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. 1I
Justice Robert Jackson's concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer also contains language that proponents of broad
Presidential war power claim supports their position. 12 In addition,
extrajudicial statements by Supreme Court Justices support the President's
12 (2006); Harold Hongju Koh, Can the President Be Torturer in Chief?, 81 IND. L.J.
1145 (2005); S. Amend. 1977, 109th Cong., adopted by 90-9 vote in Record Vote No.
249. See also CONG. REC. S 11-070-072 (Leahy, McCain constitutionality discussion).
8 Curtis Bradley, David Cole, Walter Dellinger & Ronald Dworkin et al., On NSA
Spying: A Letter to Congress, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, Feb. 9, 2006, at 42, available at
http://www.nybooks.con/articles/18650; Letter from David Barron, Harvard Law School
Professor, et al., to Harry Reid, Senate Majority Leader et al. (Jan. 17, 2007) (asserting
that Congress does have the power to give legal effect to its will with respect to U.S troop
levels
in
Iraq),
available
at
http://www.law.duke.edu/features/pdf/
congresspower-letter.pdf; Exercising Congress"s ConstitutionalPower to End a War:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter
Hearings].
9 THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961).
10
Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 139 (1866).
11 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2773 (2006). The Hamdan Court's reference to Chase's dictum
was also dicta.
12 " should indulge the widest latitude of interpretation to sustain [the President's]
exclusive function to command the instruments of national force, at least when turned
against the outside world for the security of our society." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 645 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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exclusive Executive power to move troops and to direct campaigns.1 3 These
statements notwithstanding, the Supreme Court has never invalidated
legislation because it interfered with the President's Commander in Chief
power to conduct military operations. 14
The Administration's claim of unchecked power to conduct battlefield
operations, a position that is ironically accepted by both the Administration
.and many of its critics, raises difficult questions as to where to draw the line
between congressional and Executive power over the conduct of warfare. The
Administration's argument starts with the proposition that Congress could
not statutorily require the President to shift the 101st Airborne division from
Baghdad to Anbar province. Similarly, Congress could not have directed
FDR to launch D-Day at Brittany rather than Normandy, or to initiate an
invasion of France in 1943 instead of attacking Italy. The Administration and
its critics appear to agree on this point.
The Administration then argues that actions that are important to military
success on the battlefield also fall within the sphere of exclusive presidential
power. So, for example, what if commanders believe that a prisoner captured
on the battlefield possesses information critical to the success of the battle?
Proponents of broad Presidential power would argue that the issue of how,
when, and where you interrogate him or her is just as much a tactical military
decision as the decision about where troops should be placed and how
campaigns should be conducted. So too, the Administration would argue that
the power to make decisions about how and where to place spies to obtain
information about enemy plans is a part of the President's power to conduct
military campaigns.
13 William Howard Taft wrote in 1915 that the President's Commander in Chief

power made it "perfectly clear that Congress could not order battles to be fought on a
certain plan, and could not direct parts of the army to be moved from one part of the
country to another." William Howard Taft, The Boundaries Between the Executive, the
Legislative and the JudicialBranches of the Government, 25 YALE L.J. 599, 610 (1916).
In 1917, Charles Evans Hughes claimed that, while Congress had unlimited power to
create an army,
it is for the President as Commander-in-Chief to direct the campaigns of that army
wherever he may think they should be carried on ... Congress in the event of war is
confided the power to enact whatever legislation is necessary to prosecute [the war]
with vigor and success, and this power is to be exercised without impairment of the
authority committed to the President as Commander-in-Chief to direct military
operations.
CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, WAR POWERS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, S. Doc. No. 65-105,

at 7-8 (1st Sess. 1917).
14
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11, 14; David Barron, Testimony Before the
United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary on "Exercising Congress's
Constitutional Power to End a War,"
Jan.
30, 2007, available at
http://judiciary/.senate.gov/ testimony.cfin?id=2504&wit-id=6037.
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Taking this premise a step further, the Administration argues that
Congress could not interfere with the President's wartime decisions to
engage in electronic surveillance against the enemy by requiring him to
obtain a warrant. Similarly, if Congress could not limit the D-Day invasion
force to a certain number of soldiers, then Congress could not disapprove the
President's surge strategy in Iraq.
Once one accepts the Administration's starting proposition that the
President has broad exclusive power to make tactical battlefield decisions, a
proposition most commentators appear to accept, the possibilities for
extension seem almost limitless. 15 Yet, as this Article will demonstrate, that
starting proposition is erroneous.
The critical flaw in the basic premise supporting exclusive presidential
powers in war is that it ignores Congress's own panoply of war powers.
Arrayed against the President's sole war power as Commander in Chief, the
Constitution vests Congress with powers to declare war, issue letters of
marque and reprisal, to raise armies and navies, to make rules concerning
captures on land and water, and to make rules for the regulation of the army
and navy. 16 Furthermore, congressional authority to define offenses against
the law of nations, its power to appropriate funds, and its power to make all
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution its
powers are also important wartime powers. 17 Congressional power over
warfare also seems logically limitless, and the Constitution seems to provide
Congress with substantial power to check virtually all the President's
Commander in Chief powers. Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall once observed
18
that the "whole powers of war" are vested in Congress.
Despite the widespread debate and criticism, the Administration's
underlying theory of the relationship between the President's Commander in
Chief power and Congress's war powers has not been examined.' 9 As two
15 In Youngstown Sheet & Tube, Justice Jackson wrote of the necessity, yet
difficulty, of limiting the President's Commander in Chief powers:
U]ust what authority goes with the name has plagued presidential advisers who
would not waive or narrow it by nonassertion yet cannot say where it begins or ends.
It undoubtedly puts the Nation's armed forces under presidential command. Hence,
this loose appellation is sometimes advanced as support for any presidential action,
internal or external, involving use of force, the idea being that it vests power to do
anything, anywhere, that can be done with an army or navy.
343 U.S. 579, 641-42 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-14.
17Id. at § 8, cls. 1, 10, 18.
18 Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1800).
19 Saikrishna Prakash, Regulating the Commander in Chief, 81 IND. L.J. 1319, 1319,
1323 (2005); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Emancipation Proclamation and the
Commander in ChiefPower, 40 GA. L. REV. 807, 825 (2006) (agreeing with Prakash that
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Administration critics recognize, "[f]or the past eighty years, no scholar has
undertaken an in depth analysis of the proper line of demarcation between
the Commander in Chiefs exclusive power over battlefield operations and
'20
the areas where Congress and the President share concurrent authority.
For the last half of the twentieth century, the focus of scholarly and
political debate has been on the President's power as Commander in Chief to
initiate warfare, not the allocation of power between the President and
Congress to conduct warfare authorized by Congress. Modem presidents
asserted a power to initiate warfare without congressional authorization, a
position hotly debated in Congress, the courts, and the academy. Even the
passage of the War Powers Resolution of 1973 did not quell the dispute
between Congress and the President as to the extent of independent
Executive authority to initiate warfare. 2 1 This debate has largely subsumed
and submerged the important related, yet independent, question of the scope

an "exhaustive analysis" of the Commander in Chief power "has not yet appeared in print
in any book or article of which either of us is aware").
After this Article was accepted for publication, and while it was in the editing
process, a lengthy two-part article analyzing the relationship between the Commander in
Chief power and Congress' war powers was published by the HarvardLaw Review. See
David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest EbbFraming the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARv. L. REv. 689
(2008); David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chiefat its Lowest
Ebb-A ConstitutionalHistory, 121 HARv. L. REv. 941 (2008).
20
Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the PresidentBound by the Geneva Conventions?,
90 CORNELL L. REv. 97, 171-72 n.395 (2004). The one scholar Jinks and Sloss mention is
Clarence A. Berdahl, whose book, War Powers of the Executive in the United States, first
published in 1920, takes a sweeping view of the Commander in Chief power that might
support at least some of the Administration's claims. See also Prakash, supra note 19, at
1323 (claiming that "far too many" have avoided undertaking the historical research
necessary to determine the proper boundaries of the President's Commander in Chief
power); see also Michael Ramsey, Torturing Executive Powers, 93 GEO. L.J. 1213, 1242
n. 116 (2005) (arguing that some line must be drawn between permissible and
impermissible congressional military regulations, and tentatively suggesting such a line,
but noting that the author has not made a detailed study of the matter). The one work that
Jinks and Sloss appear to have overlooked is Francis Wormuth and Edwin Firmage's
1986 book To Chain the Dog of War: The War Power of Congress in History andLaw,
which does devote a chapter to the Commander in Chief Clause. For helpful recent
studies addressing the scope of the President's Commander in Chief power to conduct
warfare, see also Louis FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (2d ed. 2004); David Gray
Adler, The Law: George Bush as Commander in Chief: Toward the Nether World of
Constitutionalism,36 PREs. STUDIES Q. 525 (2006); David Gray Adler, George Bush and
the Abuse of History: The Constitution and PresidentialPower in Foreign Affairs, 12
UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 75, 130-35 (2007).
21 War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (2000).
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of the President's Commander in Chief power to conduct a war that Congress
22
has duly authorized.
This Article will address that largely unexplored question, and will
challenge the underlying premise that the President has exclusive control
over operational and tactical decisions involving the conduct of military
operations in wartime. Part I of the Article discusses various attempts to draw
a line between the President's Commander in Chief powers and
congressional war powers once war has been authorized and initiated. Part II
will review the history of the Commander in Chief Clause, as well as
congressional efforts to limit the Executive's discretion in fighting a war. Part
22 Professors Barron and Lederman claim that academic war powers scholarship has
generally overemphasized questions of Congress' abdication of its constitutional war
powers and therefore not adequately addressed Executive use of military force in
disregard of legislative will. Barron & Lederman, supra note 19, at 698-704. The reason
that war powers scholars have often focused on the problem of congressional silence or
abdication is that until recently the primary scholarly debate involved the initiation of
warfare and not its conduct. Many scholars and courts concluded that the President had
no independent power to initiate warfare and therefore argued that congressional silence
or acquiescence could not empower the Executive to initiate hostilities abroad. See, e.g.,
sources cited in note 19 supra. Where, however, Congress set clear limits to the
Executive's war-making authority, as in the War Powers Resolution, scholars vigorously
debated the extent, if any, of the President's preclusive authority to act despite
congressional will to the contrary. Compare Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutionality of
the War Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L. REV. 101 (1984) with J. Terry Emerson, The War
Powers Resolution Tested: The President's Independent Defense Power, 51 NoTRE
DAME L. REv. 187 (1975). The Courts, however, refused to decide the issue of the War
Powers Resolution's constitutionality, despite various cases which posed the question.
Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 815 (2000);
Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1990); Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333
(D.D.C. 1987), aff'd, No. 87-5426 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 17, 1988); Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F.
Supp. 893, 899 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
The reason that questions of Executive power to act in defiance of legislative will
has now resurfaced is not because Congress has been less acquiescent in the war on
terror, for it has not. Nor has the Supreme Court seriously grappled with the boundary
between legislative and Executive power in conducting warfare against terrorists. Hamdi
and Hamdan, for example, both principally involved the question of whether Congress's
authorization for war provided the requisite statutory authority for the President to take
actions which, in the absence of such authority, would conflict with prior congressional
statutes. The reason that the question of Presidential power to act in disregard of
congressional will has now come to the fore is not found in a new congressional and
judicial assertiveness, but rather, as Baron and Lederman point out, due to the Bush
Administration's articulation of extremely broad theories of Executive power to conduct
warfare and override legislative enactments, combined with the ambiguous and
untraditional nature of the war on terror which raises more questions as to Congress's
power to control how a war is fought. What has dramatically changed is the focus of
scholarly inquiry from which branch initiates warfare to which branch can control the
conduct of warfare once initiated.
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III will discuss the implications and lessons of that history, arguing that as a
matter of history, policy, and constitutional theory, Congress has broad,
concurrent power to determine both strategies and tactics in fighting the war
it has authorized. This last Part will set forth a definition and understanding
of concurrent powers over the conduct of war, an area which has thus far
remained largely unexplored in both academic literature and judicial
decisions.
Separation of powers doctrine generally operates on what has been
termed a horizontal axis to draw subject matter lines to separate and
demarcate the proper boundaries between legislative, executive, and judicial
authority. 2 3 The powers of Congress and the President to control the conduct
of a war authorized by Congress is best understood, however, if viewed
sequentially, not horizontally. Rather than drawing a boundary between
legislative and executive power based on subject matter or some other
normative principle, the two branches have concurrent constitutional power
over the conduct of authorized warfare. Those powers are divided in practice
by timing, not subject matter. The President has the power of initiative, the
ability and authority to act quickly in the face of rapidly changing wartime
realities in the theater of action. Congress, on the other hand, has a more
deliberative, reflective power, allowing it to check and limit presidential
initiative both before and after the Executive acts.
I. THEORIES OF THE ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY BETWEEN CONGRESS
AND THE PRESIDENT OVER THE CONDUCT OF WARFARE

Scholars and judges have developed or suggested several theories in an
effort to draw a line between the Executive's Commander in Chief powers
and Congress's broad war powers. These theories attempt to articulate the
proper allocation of authority between Congress and the President over the
conduct of warfare. They start by accepting the Administration's premise that
the Commander in Chief has some preclusive substantive authority to
conduct battlefield operations, but seek to limit that Executive power.
A. InternationalLaw/Human Rights Theory
The first theory relies on the congressional authority to implement
international law. 24 One formulation of this theory accepts that the President
23 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 452 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring);
Victoria Nourse, The Vertical Separationof Powers, 49 DUKE L.J. 749, 751 (1999).
24
Jinks & Sloss, supra note 20, at 176-78; Debate: Allocating the Nuclear War
Powers Under the Constitution, in FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 94, 98-99 (Peter
Raven Hansen ed., 1987) [hereinafter Debate] (Testimony of John Norton Moore,
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has sweeping power to conduct military operations, which would ordinarily
preclude Congress from interfering with the President's control over
battlefield operations. However, Congress's power to implement
international law permits it to enforce treaty provisions, and in doing so exert
some control over battlefield operations. An example might be legislation
that enforces the international prohibition on attacking undefended towns or
the Geneva Conventions' rules on the treatment of prisoners. 25
Another formulation of this theory relies heavily on the principle that the
President cannot violate fundamental human rights norms such as the
prohibition on torture or genocide. 26 Congress could legislate to force the
President to comply with such human rights norms.
B. Homefront/BattlefieldDistinction Theory
Another theory would draw a line between the President's control over
battlefield operations and Executive initiatives undertaken in the United
States, purportedly to support military operations abroad. Indeed, that
distinction was a basic thrust of both the majority and Justice Jackson's
opinions in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.2 7 Under this theory,
domestic surveillance of U.S. citizens allegedly communicating with the
enemy would be treated differently than spying on the enemy in the theater
of military action. So it would follow that the President's power to detain an
American citizen seized at a U.S. airport as an "enemy combatant" would be
different from the power to detain an American citizen captured on the
battlefield. This analysis is supported by the Supreme Court's opinions in
Hamdi and Hamdan, which suggest that the President's Commander in Chief
power should be limited to military actions taken on or near an actual
battlefield. 2 8 In Hamdi, the plurality distinguished between "initial captures
on the battlefield," which were unreviewable, and the review process
required "when the determination is made to continue to hold those who have
distinguishing congressional authority to prohibit weapons already barred by
international law from weapons that are not).
25 Jinks & Sloss, supra note 20, at 174-77. For example, Jinks and Sloss argue that
"[i]f there were no international legal rule prohibiting, for example, the bombing of
undefended towns, then Congress could not create such a rule; it would be beyond the
scope of Article I."Id. at 176-77.
26

27

See generally Koh, supra note 7.

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 579-89, 634-55 (1952).
See also Jinks & Sloss, supra note 20, at 174-75 (distinguishing congressional power to
regulate the treatment of detainees held in long-term captivity from the treatment of
detainees on the battlefield).
28 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534 (2004) (plurality); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
126 S.Ct. 2749, 2782 (2006).
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been seized."'29 While the plurality was willing to "accord the greatest respect
and consideration to the judgments of military authorities in matters relating
to the actual prosecution of a war, and recognize that the scope of that
discretion necessarily is wide," it recognized that "it does not infringe on the
core role of the military for the courts to exercise their own time-honored and
constitutionally mandated roles of reviewing and resolving claims like those
presented here."'30 Though the Court allowed the President power to detain an
American citizen captured on a foreign battlefield, it emphasized the narrow
"context" in which it reached that conclusion: "a United States citizen
31
captured in aforeign combat zone."
Similarly, Justice Stevens's opinion in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld rejecting the
Administration's attempt to unilaterally establish military commissions to try
alleged terrorists was premised on the distinction between military necessity
on the actual battlefield in the midst of combat and the claimed necessity to
detain or try a detainee several years after his or her removal from the
battlefield. For Justice Stevens and the plurality, military commissions to try
enemies who violate the laws of war-the type the Bush Administration
sought to implement-responded to the "need to dispense swift justice, often
32
in the form of execution, to illegal belligerents captured on the battlefield.
The plurality found, however, that the Administration failed "to satisfy the
most basic precondition" for its establishment of military commissions"military necessity. '33 Hamdan's tribunal was "appointed not by a
commander in the field of battle, but by a retired major general stationed
away from any active hostilities," and he was not "charged... with an overt
34
act.., in a theater of war."
Justice Stevens, in a section of the opinion representing the Court's
majority, addressed the distinction between military necessity on the
battlefield and the general conduct of warfare in discussing the statutory
requirement that procedures for military commissions must be the same as
those used to try American soldiers in courts martial (which they clearly
were not) unless the Administration could demonstrate that the court martial
procedures would not be "practicable." The Court emphasized that the
requirement that any deviation be necessitated by a showing of the
29

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534.
Id at 535.
31 Id. at 523. Apparently, the Administration was uncertain enough as to whether the
30

Supreme Court would permit executive detention of an enemy citizen captured in the
United States that it chose to prosecute Jose Padilla on criminal charges rather than
continue to detain him as an enemy combatant and risk Supreme Court review of that
detention.
32
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2782 (plurality).
33

Id.at 2785.

341Id.
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impracticability of court martial procedures "strikes a careful balance
between uniform procedure and the need to accommodate exigencies that
may sometimes arise in a theater of war." 35 The Court stated that the
President "may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper
exercise of its own war powers, placed on his powers," 36 and suggested that
whatever independent power, if any, the President has to convene such
commissions is confined to action taken in the actual theater of war or on the
37
field of battle.
C. GeneralRules/Tactical Commands Theory
A third theory would draw a line between Congress's power over
warfare and the President's Commander in Chief powers based upon a
distinction between general rules or policy determinations concerning the
conduct of warfare and specific tactical commands tailored to particular
battles or campaigns. 38 This approach is consistent with both broad
separation of powers theory and the text of the Constitution. Congress's
lawmaking function permits it to make broad policy decisions for the nation,
including policy decisions relating to military affairs. 39 The President's
duties are to implement and enforce those policies set by Congress.
Furthermore, the constitutional concern with congressional interference
with the President's Commander in Chief power over warfare typically
40
focuses on detailed congressional micromanagement of the conduct of war.
35 Id.at 2793.
36
Hamdan did not address the question of whether the President has any
independent power absent congressional authorization to convene military commissions.
37
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774 n.23 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson,
J., concurring)).
38
See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 20, at 1236-42 (distinguishing between Congress's
ability to impose general regulations on the conduct of military personnel and a
legislative effort to control specific tactical directions or provide tactical commands as to
particular battles); Hearings, supra note 8, at 9 (testimony of David J. Barron, Professor
of Law, Harvard Law School, distinguishing between day-to-day operational control over
military issues and "rule-like definitions of the nature, size, and duration of the force
available to the President").
39
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 643 (1952). (Jackson,
J., concurring); Hearings, supra note 8 (testimony of Bradford Berenson, former
Associate Counsel to President George W. Bush).
40 As then-Assistant Att'y Gen. William H. Rehnquist expressed in a 1970 memo, a
serious constitutional problem would arise "should Congress attempt by detailed
instructions as to the use of American forces already in the field to supersede the
President as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces." Memorandum from William H.
Rehnquist, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to the Hon. Charles W. Colson,
Special Counsel to the President, Re: The President and the War Power: South Vietnam
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Recognizing that Congress has power to set broad policy or make general
rules leaves the President with discretion over specific tactical decisions such
,as where to place troops, or which hill to attack, effectively addressing this
concern.
This articulation of the respective powers of Congress and the President
finds some support in the Constitutional text. Article I grants Congress the
.power "to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and
naval forces" and "to make rules concerning captures on land and water." 4 1
That language suggests that Congress has the power to make general rules
for the detention, interrogation, or trial of enemy combatants captured by the
United States.
D. Line DrawingDifficulties
While each of these three potential line-drawing theories has some
appeal, none accurately describes the proper allocation of authority over the
conduct of warfare between the legislature and the executive. The first, that
the Executive's broad power to conduct military operations is limited
primarily by Congress's authority to enforce international law, is
underinclusive. While congressional power over warfare certainly includes
the important authority to implement international law rules, the Constitution
vests Congress with other war powers, such as the power to make rules
concerning "captures" or for the "regulation of the army." These powers
would allow Congress to proscribe military conduct that does not violate
international law. Congress could, for example, require that prisoners of war
captured on the battlefield be treated in a particular manner or transferred to
particular locations if their detention were long-term, or given a particular
type of hearing to determine their status, even if those rules were not required
by international law.
The second theory of congressional power also is too limited in scope.
While the line between battlefield and homefront is relevant, it does not
accurately describe the extent of congressional power over the conduct of
warfare. Congress has the power to prohibit torture or the summary execution
of prisoners, or other abusive conduct by soldiers, whether such acts occur in
the United States or on overseas battlefields. Congress also has the power to
set funding limitations both for the military stationed in the United States and
for military actions abroad. There is no reason to limit congressional
authority to make rules and regulations for the military forces or for captures
on land or seas to non-battlefield situations. The Constitution gives Congress

and the Cambodian Sanctuaries 21 (May 22, 1970) [hereinafter Rehnquist Memo].
41 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14, cl. 11.
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the power to make rules for captures on land or sea which necessarily
includes battlefield captures because that is where most captures occur.
The third theory-based on the distinction between general rules and
specific tactics-also has surface appeal, but is unworkable when applied to
specific issues because the line between policy and tactic is too amorphous
and hazy to be useful in real world situations. For example, how does one
decide whether the use of waterboarding as a technique of interrogation is a
policy or specific tactic? Even if it is arguably a specific tactic, Congress
could certainly prohibit that tactic as antithetical to a policy prohibiting cruel
and inhumane treatment. So too, President Bush's surge strategy in Iraq
could be viewed as a tactic to promote a more stable Iraq, or as a general
policy which Congress should be able to limit through use of its funding
power. Congress can limit tactical decisions to use particular weapons such
as chemical weapons, nuclear weapons, or cluster bombs by forbidding the
42
production or use of such weapons, or simply refusing to fund them.
Congress could also, however, enact more limited and specific restrictions to
prohibit the use of nuclear weapons or land mines in a particular conflict or
even a particular theater of war. Indeed, most specific tactics could be
permitted or prohibited by a rule. In short, the distinctions between strategies
and tactics, rules and detailed instructions, or policies and tactics are simply
labels which are virtually indistinguishable. Labeling an activity with one of
these terms is largely a distinction without a difference. Accordingly, these
labels are not helpful to the real problem of determining the respective
43
powers of Congress and the President.
The indeterminate nature of these labels is illustrated by the following
examples. After the Nixon Administration's 1970 "incursion" into
Cambodia, Congress sought to prohibit any such future actions by providing
that "none of the funds authorized or appropriated pursuant to this or any
other Act may be used to finance the introduction of United States ground
combat troops into Cambodia, or to provide United States advisors to or for

For example, Congress has limited the transportation, deployment, storage, and
disposal of chemical and biological weapons. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1511-20 (1982), repealed by
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, 110 Stat. 186. See also Pub. L.
No. 98-525, 98 Stat. 2493 (1984). Congress has prohibited research and development of
small mobile missiles. Pub. L. No. 98-94, 97 Stat. 614, § 206 (1983). See Allan Ides,
Congressional Authority to Regulate the Use of Nuclear Weapons, in FIRST USE OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS: UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, WHO DECIDES?, 80-82 (Peter RavenHansen ed., 1987).
43 In a related separation of powers context, the Court has noted that "[o]ur
separation-of-powers analysis does not turn on the labeling of an activity as 'substantive'
as opposed to 'procedural,' or 'political' as opposed to 'judicial."' Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 393 (1989).
42
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Cambodian military forces in Cambodia." 44 Some commentators argued that
a presidential decision to attack North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia
was a "tactical maneuver" within the President's "complete and exclusive
power," and that therefore any congressional prohibition of such tactical
decisions would be unconstitutional. 45 However, such a use of American
military power clearly reflected a major policy decision that escalated the
conflict into other sovereign states and had important effects and
consequences for U.S. foreign policy. As one commentator put it, the
incursion "was [not] purely a tactical field decision. '46 Indeed, then-Assistant
Attorney General William H. Rehnquist wrote that a congressional restriction
providing that U.S. troops not be sent into Laos or Thailand in connection
with the Vietnam conflict was accepted by the Executive, thereby suggesting
that such restrictions did not impermissibly interfere with the President's
47
tactical military decisions as Commander in Chief.
Virtually all important decisions as to the conduct of a war-whether to
escalate or de-escalate, institute a "surge," treat prisoners consistently with
the Geneva Conventions, etc.-can be framed as either "tactical" military
decisions for the President to make as Commander in Chief or broad policy
decisions for Congress to make under its war powers. Of course, certain
decisions, such as "send this division to take this particular town," for
example, seem more "tactical" than a decision to invade a country like
Cambodia in 1970. Nevertheless, as a general matter the policy/tactic
dichotomy is unlikely to be helpful when analyzing disputes that arise
between the President and Congress about the conduct of war. Congress is
unlikely to enact laws that interfere with tactical command decisions unless it
44 Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-652, § 7(a), 84 Stat. 1942,

1943 (1971).
45

JOHN NORTON MOORE, LAW AND THE INDO-CHINA WAR 566 n.22 (1972); Robert

H. Bork, Comments on the Articles on the Legality of the United States Action in
Cambodia, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 76, 79-80 (1971); John Norton Moore, Legal Dimensions
of the Decision to Intercede in Cambodia, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 38, 63 (1971) (noting that
the facts "strongly suggest that the action is most appropriately characterized as a
command decision incident to the conduct of the Vietnam War"); Peter Raven-Hansen &
William C. Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings of the Commander in Chief, 80 VA. L. REV.
833, 916 (1994) (concluding that "[g]iven the colorable tactical necessity for the
Cambodian border incursion," congressional restrictions prohibiting the President from
taking such action would be unconstitutional); William H. Rehnquist, The Constitutional
Issues-Administration Position, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 628, 638 (1970) ("The President's
determination to authorize incursion into these Cambodian border areas is precisely the
sort of tactical decision traditionally confided to the Commander-in-Chief in the conduct
of armed conflict.").
46 William D. Rogers, The Constitutionalityof the Cambodian Incursion, 65 AM. J.
INT'L L. 26, 35 (1971).
47
Rehnquist Memo, supra note 40, at 21.
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believes that the subject is important to national policy. But it is precisely
those types of "policy" issues that the policy/tactic dichotomy is ill-equipped
to resolve.
Even if one looks at decisions which appear on the surface to be of a
tactical military nature, applying the policy/tactic distinction does not yield a
clear result. If Congress, for example, were to instruct the President to bomb
certain railway lines in enemy territory, that would seem to be a tactical
military decision within the core Commander in Chief power. Generally it
would be ludicrous for Congress to so interfere with the military's conduct of
warfare. But suppose railway lines are being used to transport thousands of
civilians to death camps, as the Nazis did in World War II, and that, despite
this knowledge, an American President decided not to use our air power to
destroy those lines and thereby save thousands of civilians (a decision the
Roosevelt Administration unfortunately made). Then, if Congress could
summon the political will to enact legislation (presumably over Presidential
veto) that required the President to bomb railway lines used to transport
civilians to death camps, would it be an impermissible infringement on the
President's tactical decision making? Congress would be expressing the
policy or rule that it wanted to use our military power to protect these
civilians, leaving to the President the determination of how best to tactically
implement that policy. Thus, destroying particular railways could reflect
either a policy or tactic depending on the situation. The real question is not
whether some decision can be described as either a tactic or general policy,
but which branch of government should have ultimate authority to make that
decision.
Moreover, to the extent that the concern is congressional
micromanagement of the conduct of our armies in the field, the policy/tactic
distinction does not effectively address that concern. For example, Bradford
Berenson, the former Associate Counsel to President Bush, recently told a
congressional committee that
if Congress were to enact a law providing that no American soldier could be
sent into combat without body armor, there would be a strong argument that
such an enactment impermissibly interferes with the commander in chief's
discretion to order lightly armed or lightly equipped troops to proceed by
stealth into battle in appropriate circumstances.48
But such a law clearly sets forth a general rule or policy. The objection to
it is not that it is too narrowly focused on particular tactics, but that it sweeps
too broadly, thus depriving the President of discretion and flexibility to
48 Exercising Congress' Constitutional Power to End a War: Hearing before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (Testimony of Bradford A.

Berenson, former Associate Counsel to the President).
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prosecute the war. But precisely because laws effectuate general policies,
they deprive the President of discretion which he or she claims is necessary
to fight a war. Indeed, President Bush's objection to the McCain Amendment
prohibiting torture or cruel and inhumane treatment was structurally similar
to Berenson's-the rule, which expresses Congress's policy judgment, would
deprive him of necessary discretion in special circumstances, to use methods
of interrogation that would not be countenanced under the general
prohibition. Thus, if the goal is to accord the Commander in Chief the
maximum flexibility to fight a war, the policy/tactic distinction is of no use,
and in fact is counterproductive.
Finally, attempting to draw any line based on how close a particular law
comes to conveying tactical orders will lead legislators and executive
officials to argue about the label to apply to a particular legislative
restriction. This leads to an unsubstantive debate over labels, which does not
confront the underlying realities and constitutional values that ought to be
central to the debate over which branch should have ultimate control. The
history of the pre-New Deal Supreme Court's attempt to deal with the
overlapping authority between the states and federal government to regulate
economic activity within a state that affects the broader economy suggests
that this exercise in labeling will be unworkable and counterproductive. The
Supreme Court analyzed economic activity in terms of formal categories
such as direct versus indirect effects, an approach which proved to be
unworkable and destructive in practice. This experience argues against
proceeding down that path with a similar labeling approach in the equally
murky area of conflicting authority between the President and Congress over
49
the conduct of an authorized war.
The inability of any of these theories to accurately draw a coherent and
useful line between Congress's supervisory power over the conduct of
authorized warfare and the President's Commander in Chief power to
conduct warfare leads to a normative and structural inquiry as to which
branch ought to have power in which circumstances over the conduct of
warfare.
E. Alternative Theories to Line Drawing: Balancing and
Contextual Approaches
The first possibility is to eschew an attempt at drawing a clear line
between the President's Commander in Chief power and Congress's war
49Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942) ("[Q]uestions of the power of
Congress are not to be decided by reference to any formula which would give controlling
force to nomenclature such as 'production' and 'indirect."'); cf A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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powers and adopt a contextual, balancing approach to determine whether
Congress has impermissibly interfered with the President's Commander in
Chief powers. In recent years, the Supreme Court has often employed an ad
hoc balancing test to decide separation of powers issues, asking whether
legislation disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate branches "[by]
prevent[ing] the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally
assigned functions." 50 That type of analysis would assess the constitutionality
of any particular restriction by asking whether the statute involved prevents
the President "from accomplishing [his] constitutionally assigned functions"
and whether the extent of the interference with the President's Commander in
Chief powers is nonetheless "justified by an overriding need to promote
51
objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress."
Another balancing approach might examine elements of each of the
different line-drawing theories of the President's Commander in Chief
power, as well as the history of congressional regulation of the particular
issue involved. This approach might question (1) whether Congress was
implementing an international law norm, such as the prohibition against
torture or cruel and inhumane treatment; (2) whether the regulation involved
conduct occurring in a military theater abroad or activity in the United States
more aptly characterized as domestic; (3) how detailed, specific, and tactical
an intrusion into military matters Congress had enacted; and (4) whether this
was an area, such as the trial of enemy combatants by military commissions,
where Congress had a history of regulation.
A somewhat different contextual approach has been suggested by
Professors Feldman and Issacharoff, who argue that "the constitutional test,
in the spirit of Justice Jackson, should be whether Congress is defining the
conflict in a way that makes realistic sense in the light of how modern
52
conflict is actually fought and understood by modern combatants."
The critical difficulty with a contextual approach is its inherent
ambiguity and lack of clarity, which tends to sharply shift the balance of
power in favor of a strong President acting in disregard of congressional will.
For example, the application of the Feldman and Issacharoff test asking
whether the congressional restriction makes realistic sense in the modern
world would yield no coherent separation of powers answer if applied to the
current Administration's confrontation with Congress. It would undoubtedly
embolden the President to ignore Congress's strictures. The President's
50

Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1988) (quoting Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen.
Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (internal quotation marks removed)).
51 Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 485 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(1988).
52 Noah Feldman & Samuel Issacharoff, Congress has the Power to Make and End
War-Not Manage It, SLATE, Mar. 5, 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2161172.
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advisors would argue that the McCain Amendment's ban on cruel and
inhumane treatment, or FISA's requirement of a warrant, does not make
realistic sense in the context of the contemporary realities of the war on terror
in which we face a shadowy, ruthless non-state enemy that has no respect for
laws or civilized conduct, a conclusion hotly disputed by those opposed to
the President's policies. Focusing the debate over whether Congress has the
power to control the treatment of detainees on the President's claim that the
modem realities of warfare require a particular approach will merge the
separation of powers inquiry of who has the power with the political
determination of what the policy ought to be. Such an approach is likely to
encourage the President to ignore and violate legislative wartime enactments
whenever he or she believes that a statute does not make realistic sense-that
53
is, when it conflicts with a policy the President embraces.
The contextual approach has a "zone of twilight" quality that Justice
Jackson suggested in Youngstown. 54 Often constitutional norms matter less
than political realities-wartime reality often favors a strong President who
will overwhelm both Congress and the courts. While it is certainly correctas Jackson noted-that neither the Court nor the Constitution will preserve
separation of powers where Congress is too politically weak to assert its
authority, a fluid contextual approach is an invitation to Presidents to push
beyond the constitutional boundaries of their powers and ignore legislative
enactments that seek to restrict their wartime authority.
Moreover, another substantial problem with a contextual approach in the
55
war powers context is that the judiciary is unlikely to resolve the dispute.
53 Such a test is also likely to invoke the very fears and passions that Madison and
other Framers thought could lead to executive aggrandizement during wartime. See, e.g.,
JAMES MADISON, LETTERS OF HELVIDIUS, No. IV (1793), reprintedin 6 THE WRITINGS OF

JAMES MADISON 174 (G. Hunt. ed., 1906); see generally infra pp. 416, 421-22.
54
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,

concurring).
55 For example, Professor Mark Rosen has recently suggested that Justice Jackson's
position in Youngstown, that where the President and Congress have concurrent authority
the President is categorically precluded from violating a congressional statute, might be
replaced by a noncategorical rule that Presidential action inconsistent with statutory
requirements would be strongly presumed to be unconstitutional, a presumption that

might be rebutted only upon a showing of a compelling governmental interest and that
the President's actions were narrowly tailored. Mark A. Rosen, Revisiting Youngstown:
Against the View that Jackson's Concurrence Resolves the Relation Between Congress
and the Commander-in-Chief 54 UCLA L. REv. 1703, 1738 (2007). But that assumes
that a court would determine when the President's assertion of a compelling interest was
justified, an unwarranted assumption in the context of Presidential treatment of prisoners
held abroad, secret wartime surveillance, or challenges to congressional restrictions on
the troops abroad. What Cohen's approach would then lead to in practice would be
executive claims that the President had a compelling interest to ignore the relevant
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The persistent refusal of the judiciary to adjudicate the constitutionality of
the War Powers Resolution strongly suggests that courts will often refuse to
intervene to resolve disputes between the President and Congress over the
constitutionality of a statute that a President claims impermissibly interferes
with her conduct of an ongoing war.56 This result leaves the political
branches to engage in an intractable dispute over the statute's
constitutionality that saps the nation's energy, diverts focus from the political
issues in dispute, and endangers the rule of law.
Additionally, in wartime it is often important for issues relating to the
exercise of war powers to be resolved quickly. Prompt action is not usually
the forte of the judiciary.
If, however, a constitutional consensus exists or could be consolidated
that Congress has the authority to check the President's conduct of warfare,
that consensus might help embolden future Congresses to assert their power.
Such a consensus might also help prevent the crisis, chaos, and stalemate that
may result when the two branches assert competing constitutional positions
and, as a practical matter, judicial review is unavailable to resolve the
dispute.
Moreover, the adoption of a contextual, realist approach will undermine
rather than aid the cooperation and compromise between the political
branches that is so essential to success in wartime. In theory, an unclear,
ambiguous division of power between the branches that leaves each branch
uncertain of its legal authority could further compromise and cooperation.
57
However, modem social science research suggests that the opposite occurs.
Each side in the dispute is likely to grasp onto aspects or factors within the
ambiguous or complex reality to support its own self-serving position. This
self-serving bias hardens each side's position and allows the dispute to drag
on, as has happened with the ongoing, unresolved dispute over the
constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution.
F. BroadPresidentialPowerApproach
The second alternative theory would be to make a judgment as to which
branch is structurally and functionally better situated to make the ultimate
statutory restrictions and congressional counterclaims that he or she did not, claims that a
court would be unlikely to resolve. That does not seem like a productive way to resolve
disputes over congressional power to regulate the conduct of warfare.
56
See, e.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Ange v. Bush, 752
F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1990); Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987).
57
See Leigh Thompson & George Loewenstein, Egocentric Interpretations of
Fairness and Interpersonal Conflict, 51 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION
PROCESSES 176 (1992); see also Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1960).
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decision on military tactics and strategies involving the conduct of warfare. It
could be argued that, because the President has access to more and better
information, has more expertise in wartime decisions, and can move more
decisively and with greater speed, the President's Commander in Chief
power to conduct war should predominate. So long as the President is making
what can plausibly be viewed as a military, operational decision involving
the conduct of an authorized war, his or her decision is preclusive, and
Congress's involvement is constitutionally prohibited.
That position has the advantage of drawing a clear line that defines
which branch has authority. It also approximates the Bush Administration's
position. Nevertheless, it is inconsistent with the Constitution's design to
provide checks on the President's power to conduct warfare. The
Constitution's text provides such checks not only by requiring that Congress
must authorize the initiation of warfare, but also by according Congress
substantial power once war breaks out: to regulate captures, to provide rules
for the armed forces, to provide funding for warfare, to raise an army, to
define offenses against the law of nations, and to issue letters of marque and
reprisal.5 8 A virtually unlimited and unchecked presidential power to fight
wars is not only inconsistent with the words of the constitutional text and the
Framers' intent, but with the broad conceptions of checks and balances that
our history has read into those words. Our Constitution has been correctly
viewed as providing a system both strong enough to defend and sustain the
Republic, yet weak enough to prevent one individual from arrogating to
himself all power to conduct war. As the Supreme Court's Hamdi plurality
'5 9
succinctly put it, "a state of war is not a blank check for the President.
G. Reassessing the Scope of Commander in Chief Power: A
ConcurrentPower Approach
Given the fatal flaws in all of the approaches discussed above, perhaps
the suppositions that underlie those theories should be reexamined before
formulating a new theory. The alternative approach to be explored in the
remainder of this Article starts by challenging the commonly accepted
understanding that the President has exclusive authority over battlefield
operations and that Congress cannot participate in the conduct of campaigns.
As a matter of constitutional logic and history, that usually agreed on
proposition is untenable. 60 As Part II of this Article demonstrates, throughout
our history-from the Quasi-War with France to the Civil War to the
58

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004).
60
See Part II, infra pp. 415-45 for a full discussion of the restrictions Congress
placed on the Commander in Chief's power to conduct war throughout our history.
59

has

2008]

COMMANDER IN CHIEFAND CONGRESS

Vietnam conflict--on numerous occasions Congress has enacted legislation
that interfered with the President's so-called exclusive authority over
battlefield operations and campaigns. Moreover, the constitutional grant of
authority to the President to-be Commander in Chief was not designed by the
Framers to preclude congressional authority over the conduct of warfare.
Rather, the Framers' grant to Congress of the powers to raise and support
armies, to declare war, to issue -letters of marque and reprisal, and to provide
rules for the armed forces and rules governing captures was designed to
provide important checks on the President's Commander in Chief power.
There is no basis in the text of the Constitution or logic to limit Congress's
substantive power over the conduct of warfare powers and make them
subservient to the President's Commander in Chief power. For example,
Congress's power to raise an army means that it can raise an army with
certain weapons, not others, and a certain number of troops and no more. As
Professor Stephen Carter points out:
Nothing in the language or structure of the Constitution suggests a
distinction between rules limiting the number of tanks and limiting the
theatres of operation. One might, I suppose, try to argue that restrictions on
the number of soldiers or amount of equipment are limits on what the armed
forces shall be; stipulations on where or how these forces can fight are
limits on what the armed forces may do. But that difference-if it is a
difference-is merely semantical. 6 1
Congress can therefore say the army shall not be one with nuclear
weapons or that it shall have nuclear weapons but only use them in response
to a nuclear attack-both of which would be important restrictions on the
President's ability to use tactical nuclear weapons in a battlefield situation.
Or the Congress could (and has) said that it will be an army that does not use
ground troops in a particular conflict, or does not torture prisoners. All these
restrictions, which Carter views as definitional and nearly always
'62
constitutional, effectively say, "We have created this army, not that one."
So too, the congressional power to declare or authorize war has been
long held to permit Congress to authorize and wage a limited war--"limited
in place, in objects, and in time."' 63 When Congress places such restrictions
on the President's authority to wage war, it limits the President's discretion
to conduct battlefield operations. For example, Congress authorized President
George H. W. Bush to attack Iraq in response to Iraq's 1990 invasion of
61 Stephen L. Carter, War Making Under the Constitution and the First Use of
Nuclear Weapons, in FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHO
DECIDES? 109, 113 (Peter Raven-Hansen ed., 1987).
62
Id.
63 Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 43 (1800).
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Kuwait, but it confined the President's authority to the use of U.S. armed
forces pursuant to U.N. Security Council resolutions directed to force Iraqi
troops to leave Kuwait. That restriction would not have permitted the
President to march into Baghdad after the Iraqi army had been decisively
ejected from Kuwait, a limitation recognized by President Bush himself.64
Yet that restriction seems to be the very kind of limitation on a
President's tactical battlefield command that the commonly accepted premise
would not permit. But if Congress can thus limit the purpose of the war
against an enemy, why could it not impose other similar restrictionslimiting for example the theater of war, or even the places the military can
attack? If the 1991 Persian Gulf Resolution was constitutional-and nobody
claimed it was not-Congress could have authorized war against Germany
for the purpose of protecting Britain and liberating Western Europe, while
not permitting combat operations into Germany or other theaters of action
such as the Middle East or North Africa. Congress would never have done so,
but the 1991 Persian Gulf authorization suggests that it could have. The 1991
Persian Gulf authorization is not an anomaly; Congress has limited the
objects, purposes, and tactics Presidents could use in conducting war
throughout our history.
Congress and the President therefore share concurrentauthority over the
conduct of warfare once it has been authorized by Congress, and the only
Commander in Chief power that Congress is constitutionally precluded from
removing is the President's power to command the military. Congress can
neither appoint itself military commander, nor establish a committee of
Congress to be military commander. It cannot force the President to remove a
commanding general that Congress does not like. Nor can Congress prevent
the President from dismissing an officer, nor dictate which officers will be
appointed to which commands. Nevertheless, even regarding military
personnel decisions, Congress has adopted rules and procedures that have
65
limited, without taking away, the President's powers to command.
64 H.R.J. Res. 77, 105 Stat. 3 (1991). Bush and his national security advisor later

explained that one of the reasons that he did not order a march to Baghdad was that
"[o]ur stated mission, as codified in UN resolutions, was a simple one--end the
aggression, knock Iraq's forces out of Kuwait, and restore Kuwait's leaders. To occupy
Iraq... would have taken us way beyond the imprimatur of international law bestowed
by resolutions of the Security Council...." GEORGE BUSH & BRENT SCOWCROFT, A
WORLD TRANSFORMED 464 (1998). While Bush did not recognize the constitutional
necessity for Congress's authorization of the war, the fact is that Congress did
specifically authorize him to act and limited his discretion to use American troops to
removing Iraqi troops from Kuwait as opposed to providing him unlimited authority to
attack Iraq. See FISHER, supra note 20, at 172-73.
65 See Richard Hartzman, Congressional Control of the Military in a Multilateral
Context, 162 Mu. L. REv. 50 (1999) (arguing that Congress may prohibit the President
from appointing a U.N. commander to command U.S. troops and, more generally, has the
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While the two branches exercise concurrent authority over the conduct of
warfare, in the case of conflict, Congress's power predominates. The
President's superior access to information, closer contact with military
commanders, and experience in dealing with foreign affairs and military
matters means that in most situations he or she acts independently with the
military commanders to determine military policy and strategy. However, in
cases where Congress believes there are strong policy reasons to adopt a
strategy or tactic, the more deliberative, representative body of government
must be able to provide a check on the Executive's war power. Moreover, to
say that the President and Congress share concurrent powers on a
constitutional matter requires that the President obey the dictates of the laws
Congress enacts. It is the Executive's duty to execute the laws, and only if the
Constitution precludes Congress from exercising a certain power because it
is granted solely to another branch can the President avoid complying with
66
the law.
As set forth in greater detail in Part IV, this allocation of power shifts the
constitutional analysis away from attempting to create a substantive division
of power based on a dividing line or balancing test that assigns various
subject matters to one branch or the other. Rather it recognizes the practical
division of power based on timing and initiative. The greater speed with
which the Executive can act, the need for a unified command, and the
recognition that warfare cannot be conducted by committee led the Framers
power to enact selection criteria for commanders under the congressional power to make
rules for the government and regulation of the armed forces). Compare this perspective
with an opinion of the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel, which argues that
such a restriction is an unconstitutional infringement on the President's Commander in
Chief power. Placing of United States Armed Forces Under United Nations Operational
or Tactical Control, 20 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 182 (1996). See also FRANCIs D.
WORMUTH & EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, To CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR: THE WAR POWER OF
CONGRESS INHISTORY AND LAW 87-104 (1986).
For example, at the outset of the Mexican War, President Polk sought to appoint
Senator Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri to take command of all U.S. military forces in
the field. However, since Major General Winfield Scott was a major general and it was
understood that the Articles of War required that the officer of highest rank hold the post
of commanding general, Polk sought to have Congress create a new position of
Lieutenant General which would outrank Scott and therefore allow him to appoint
Benton. Congress failed to do so, and Polk was forced to give Scott command of the
campaign in Southern Mexico. Id. at 89. Moreover, the 1947 National Security Act
required the Secretary of Defense, not the President, to give orders directly to the armed
forces. In the days before Nixon's resignation, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff took precautions to insure that no orders from the White House were
transmitted to the army except through the constitutional and legislated chain of
command. Id. at 92.
66
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (describing third category).
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to make the President, not Congress, the Commander in Chief with the
independent constitutional power to conduct warfare once Congress decides
'that war is necessary. But that power was not to be unchecked, but rather
subject to the oversight of the broadly representative branch of government.
As a structural matter, according Congress the power to override or limit
the President's conduct of warfare preserves the balance of power between
*the branches. Were the President to have sole power over tactics and
strategies to conduct warfare, Congress would, as a practical matter, have
little check on the President. The only power Congress would then be able to
exert would be to refuse to provide any funds for the war or to impeach the
President, both of which require supermajorities (assuming the President
vetoes an appropriations bill that contains no funding for a war), or to shut
the government down if agreement cannot be reached. But to permit
Congress to predominate where there is disagreement still gives the President
substantial power to check congressional action. The President wields the
veto power, which requires Congress to muster a supermajority if it wants to
enact any restriction. The President's veto power ensures that nothing less
than a strong consensus in Congress could limit his discretion with respect to
67
the conduct of war.
Thus, in the absence of legislation to the contrary, the President can
exercise the powers of a military commander under the laws of war to
capture and detain prisoners, order soldiers into battle, and direct military
campaigns. In most situations, the President is thus free to exercise discretion
as to how to conduct warfare in the theater of combat, bounded only by the
laws of war. Moreover, as a practical matter, Congress simply cannot control
the ebb and flow of battles, direct troop movements, draw up battle plans,
and the like. But the President's power to conduct war can be superseded or
restricted by Congress if, for reasons of national policy, it desires to limit
Executive discretion.
In sum, the better reading of the Commander in Chief Clause is that it
provides the President independent constitutional authority and initiative to
act in the absence of legislation to conduct military campaigns. However, it
does not provide the President preclusive power to disregard legislation
regarding the conduct of warfare.
67

See Harold J. Krent, The Lamentable Notion ofIndefeasible PresidentialPowers:
A Reply to Professor Prakash,91 CORNELL L. REv. 1383, 1385 (2006) (arguing that the
separation of powers test should focus on the critical checks and balances functions in
determining whether Congress or the President has exceeded its authority). The President
also has, of course, the power to implement the law, and while he must enforce the law as
Congress wrote it, he often has considerable enforcement discretion that allows the
President to share the military's enforcement effort in a manner that is most consistent
with both the law and the President's policy desires, as Lincoln did during the Civil War.
See infra p. 437.
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One might object that this theory of congressional power would allow
Congress to micromanage a war by issuing detailed instructions to the
military-and that such legislation would both be harmful to the conduct of a
war and counter to the Framers' concerns about legislative interference with
the management of war. It is undisputed that as a general matter Congress
should not manage in detail military campaigns, and historically Congress
has not done so. Nor is it generally wise for Congress to micromanage federal
agencies other than the military. But Congress has the power to do so, and
political (not constitutional) considerations have prevented Congress from
doing so. Where a large majority of Congress feels strongly about a particular
issue involved in the conduct of a war, as was the case when Congress
enacted the McCain Amendment forbidding U.S. forces to use torture or
cruel and inhumane treatment, it has the constitutional authority to limit the
discretion of the President.
II. HISTORY OF CONGRESSIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE PRESIDENT'S
POWER TO CONDUCT WARFARE
Throughout American history, Congress has placed restrictions on the
President's power as Commander in Chief to conduct warfare. On numerous
occasions, Congress has authorized the President to conduct warfare but
placed significant restrictions on the time, place and manner of warfare.
Congress has regulated the tactics the President could employ, the armed
forces he could deploy, the geographical area in which those forces could be
utilized, and the time period and specific purposes for which the President
was authorized to use force. Its regulations have both swept broadly and set
forth detailed instructions and procedures for the President to follow. This
historical practice is consistent with the Constitution's text and Framers'
intent, which made clear that the President was not to have the broad powers
of the British King, but was subject to the control and oversight of Congress
in the conduct of warfare.
A. The ConstitutionalDesign
The Framers' decision to grant the President the power of Commander in
Chief of the nation's armed forces was noncontroversial. The President was
granted such power to ensure civilian supremacy and control over the
military. One of the Declaration of Independence's accusations against King
George III was that he had "affected to render the Military independent of
and superior to the Civil Power."'68 The only real dispute in the state ratifying
68

Chief

FIsHER, supra note 20, at 12; see also David J. Luban, On the Commander-inPower, 81 S. CAL. L. REv. (forthcoming 2008), available at

OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 69:391

conventions was whether to allow the President to command the army in
person, which was thought by some to be dangerous. As George Mason, a
delegate to the Constitutional Convention, noted in the Virginia Ratifying
Convention, there was agreement as to "[tihe propriety of his being
commander in chief, so far as to give orders and have a general
' '69
superintendency.
The Framers generally expressed strong concerns about a wartime
executive aggrandizing power. John Jay warned that "absolute monarchs will
often make war when their nations are to get nothing by it," 70 James Madison
characterized war as "the true nurse of executive aggrandizement," 71 and
Alexander Hamilton acknowledged that "[i]t is of the nature of war to
'72
increase the executive at the expence [sic] of the legislative authority.
Nevertheless, there can be no question that the Framers intended to vest
in the President the power to conduct a duly authorized war as Commander
in Chief. As Alexander Hamilton explained,
Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most
peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power
by a single hand. The direction of war implies the direction of the common
strength; and the power of directing and employing the common strength,
forms an usual and essential part in the definition of the executive
73
authority.
While an earlier draft of the Constitution gave the Legislature the power
"to make war," Madison and Elbridge Gerry moved to substitute declare for
make, "leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks."7 4
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=1026302 (arguing that the purpose of
the Commander in Chief Clause was to ensure civilian control of the military);
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (Jackson, J., concurring)
("The purpose of lodging dual titles in one man was to insure that the civilian would
control the military ....
).
69 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE

FEDERAL CONSTrrUTION 496 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES].
Joseph Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution, wrote that, at the ratifying
conventions, "[t]he propriety of admitting the President to be Commander in Chief, so far
as to give orders and have a general superintendency, was admitted." 2 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1492 (5th ed. 1891).
70 THE FEDERALIST NO. 4, at 18, 19 (John Jay) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961).
71 James Madison, LETTERS OF HELVIDIUS, No. IV (1793), reprinted in 6 T1HE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 174 (G. Hunt ed., 1906).
72 THE FEDERALIST No. 8, at 44, 46 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke, ed., 1961).

73 THE FEDERALIST No. 74, at 500 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961).
74 2 THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 318-19 (Max Farrand
ed., 1911).
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Madison's motion carried at first by a vote of 7-2, but after Rufus King
explained that "make" might be interpreted as authorizing Congress not only
to initiate but also to conduct war, Connecticut changed its position, so that
the vote was now 8 to 1 in favor of Madison's motion. 75 One can conclude
from this sequence that the wording was changed to permit the Executive to
repel enemy attacks and to conduct wars that Congress had initiated.
But did the Framers intend for the Commander in Chief power to allow
the President to conduct military campaigns free from congressional
interference? Two important aspects of the Constitution's text and historical
background strongly indicate that they did not.
First is the Framers' use of the term Commander in Chief. The term was
first introduced into English law by Charles I in 1639 during the First
Bishops War.76 Six years later, during the English Civil War, Parliament
appointed Sir Thomas Fairfax Commander in Chief of its forces, "'subject to
such orders and directions as he shall receive from both Houses or from the
Committee of Both Kingdoms.' 7 7 The Commander in Chief's office did not
possess unfettered, sole power to lead, but rather was made subordinate to a
superior such as Parliament or the secretary of war, who could issue orders
and instructions to him. 78 The Duke of Wellington complained that "the
commander in chief cannot move a Corporal's Guard from one station to
another, without a route countersigned by the Secretary of War. This is the
79
fundamental principle of the Constitution of the British Army."
In 1775, George Washington was appointed "General and Commander in
Chief' of the revolutionary army. Nonetheless, his commission as
Commander in Chief did not accord him independence from the Continental
Congress. Congress instructed Washington to follow the Articles of War it
adopted, "and punctually to observe and follow such orders and directions,
from time to time, as you shall receive from this, or a future Congress of
these United Colonies, or committee of Congress." 80 Congress realized that
whereas all particulars cannot be foreseen, nor positive instructions for such
emergencies so before hand given but that many things must be left to your
75 Id.; WoRMuTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 65, at 107. The official journal of the
Convention records, however, noted that on the first ballot the amendment was defeated
4-5, leading Abraham Sofaer to conclude that King might have changed more votes than
Madison's

journal

reports.

ABRAHAM

SOFAER,

WAR,

FOREIGN

AFFAIRS

AND

CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 393 n. 130 (1976).
76 WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 65, at 105.
77

Id.
78 Adler, supra note 20, at 525, 528.
79
Id. at 526-27; WoRMuTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 65.
80 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-89, 91, 96 (Worthington C.
Ford et al. eds., 1904-1937).
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prudent and discrete management, as occurrences may arise upon the place,
or from time to time fall out, you are therefore upon all such accidents or
any occasions that may happen, to use your best circumspection and
(advising with your council of war) to order and dispose of the said Army
under your command as may be most advantageous for the obtaining the
end for which these forces have been raised ....81

Despite this grant of discretion, Congress continued to issue instructions
on military tactics to the Commander in Chief. In 1775, it ordered
Washington to intercept two British vessels, 82 and to send General Gates to
take command in Canada and to send to Canada "such small brass or iron
field pieces as he can spare."8 3 In December 1776, Congress ordered General
Putnam to send forces to harass the enemy into New Jersey. Generally,
Congress gave Washington the "full power to order and direct all things
relative to the department, and to the operation of the war," but with the
important limitation "until the Congress shall order otherwise. '8 4 While
Congress often included in its instructions discretionary language such as "he
shall judge proper" or "in case he should judge it practicable, '8 5 sometimes
this language was omitted.
A number of the state constitutions adopted during the revolution or
shortly thereafter and still extant in 1787 provided that the governor of the
state was to be Commander in Chief of its military forces, but contained
explicit provisions subjecting that authority to the laws of the state. 86 For

81 Id. at

101, 108.
82 3 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-89, 276 (1775).
83 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-89, 448, 451 (1776).
84 6 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-89, 1027 (1776) (emphasis
added).
85 3 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-89, 348 (1775); 11 JOURNALS

OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-89, 684 (1778).
86

BENJAMIN PERLEY POORE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL

CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (1878). The Maryland

Constitution of 1776 provided that the Governor of the State shall alone have the
direction of the militia, and of all the regular land and sea forces, "under the laws of this
state." Id. at 825 (citing MD.CONST. of 1776, art. XXXIII). For other states, see also id.
at 275 (citing DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 9 ("The president, with the advice and consent of
the privy council, may embody the militia and act as captain-general and commander-inchief of them, and the other military force of this State, under the laws of the same.")); id.
at 966 (citing MASS. CONST. OF 1780, art. VII, Ch. 2, § 1 (subjecting Commander in Chief
power to rules and regulations of the Constitution, and the laws of the land)); id.at 1288
(citing N.H. CONST. of 1784, art. I, § 26 (same)); id.at 1911 (citing VA. CONST. of 1776,
art. IV, § 4 (the governor shall "alone have the direction of the militia, under the laws of
the country")). The language in the New Hampshire Constitution was repeated verbatim
in the constitution adopted in 1792, while the Delaware Constitution of 1792 changed the
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example, the Massachusetts and New Hampshire Constitutions named the
governor or president of the state Commander in Chief of the army and navy,
and of all the military forces of the state, and entrusted the office with the
powers "incident to the office of captain-general and commander-in-chief
and admiral, to be exercised agreeably to the rules and regulations of the
87
constitution and the laws of the land, and not otherwise."
The British and revolutionary American history makes clear that the
Commander in Chief did not have sole power to conduct warfare, but could
direct military campaigns subject to legislative oversight. While some
commentators claim that the Framers gave the President the Commander in
Chief power to conduct wars because they concluded that the Continental
88
Congress had proven itself ill-suited to that task during the Revolution, it
would have been odd and contradictory for the Framers to have used the
same title to describe an exclusive power of the President that had been used
to describe a position subordinated to Congress during the Revolution. Why
would the Framers have used the term Commander in Chief to describe a
power to conduct military campaigns free from congressional direction when
it was that very title that Washington was given during the Revolution when
he had been subjected to such direction?
Second, had the Convention sought to augment the President's powers of
Commander in Chief beyond what General Washington had possessed during
clause so that it did not contain any explicit language subjecting the Commander in Chief
power to the laws of the state. Id.at 1302-03, 282.
In 1789, Representative Thomas Tudor Tucker proposed several constitutional
amendments including one which would have deleted the President's power to be
Commander in Chief-instead providing him with the "power to direct (agreeably to law)
the operations" of the armed forces. CLARENCE A. BERDAHL, WAR POWERS OF THE
ExEcuTIvE IN THE UNITED STATES 119 n.22 (1920). Clarence Berdahl's study of
Executive war powers suggests that Tucker's purpose was to ensure that the President
could not command in person, while Abraham Sofaer's study argues that its purpose was
to limit the President's power to conduct war to the manner specified by Congress.
ABRAHAM SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 117 (1976).

That the phrase "agreeably to law" was put by Tucker in parentheses suggests that his
amendment was not introducing a new limitation on the President's power to direct the
operation of the armed forces, but rather simply reflects a common understanding
contained in these state constitutions that the President's power to direct campaigns was
subject to law. In any event, none of Tucker's proposed amendments ever got out of
committee. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 762-63 (Gales & Seaton 1834).
87
POORE,supra note 86, at 966, 1303.
88
Allan Ides, CongressionalAuthority to Regulate the Use of Nuclear Weapons, in
RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 42, at 69, 77. In fact, the main lesson that the revolution
taught the Framers was that Congress had to be given substantial power to obtain monies
to supply the army, for it was that problem and not the micromanagement of military
affairs by the Continental Congress that had proven to be most vexing during the
Revolution. Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 45, at 893.
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the Revolution, it could have clearly done so by providing the Executive with
the war powers the Commander in Chief had lacked during the Revolution.
The Framers had in the British model of war powers a handy and well-known
scheme for an Executive branch that possessed such strong war powers. But
the Framers rejected that model, which, as articulated by Sir William
Blackstone, assigned to the king the "sole prerogative to make war," to issue
letters of marque and reprisal authorizing private persons to engage in
warfare, and as the nation's first general, to raise and regulate the army and
navy.8 9 None of these war powers were given to the President. Rather,
Congress was given the power to declare war, to issue letters of marque and
reprisal, to raise armies and navies, to make rules concerning captures on
90
land and water, and to make rules for the regulation of the army and navy.
The Framers made it clear that they rejected the British model of war
powers. James Wilson argued that the British model "was inapplicable to the
situation of this Country," a view shared by other Framers. 9 1 Alexander
Hamilton and James Iredell were even more explicit in distinguishing the
powers of the British monarch and the American president. 92 As Hamilton
wrote in FederalistNo. 69:
The President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the
United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same
with that of the King of Britain but in substance much inferior to it. It would
amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the
military and naval forces, as first General and Admiral of the Confederacy;
while that of the British Kings extends to the declaring of war and raising
and regulating of fleets and armies,-all which, by the Constitution under
consideration, would appertain to the Legislature. 93
The assignment to Congress of the power to issue letters of marque and
reprisal is instructive of the limitations on the Commander in Chief's power.
By the late 1700s, the term marque and reprisal had come to have two
meanings. The first, more traditional usage of the term was to denote letters
issued by the king to private individuals-privateers, usually merchant
vessels-which were outfitted with guns and authorized to fight on behalf of
89 Louis

Fisher, Lost ConstitutionalMoorings: Recovering the War Power, 81 IND.

L.J. 1199, 1201-02 (2006); EDWARD KEYNES, UNDECLARED WAR: TWILIGHT ZONE OF
CONSTITUIONAL POWER 22-25 (1982).
90 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
91 Fisher, supra note 89, at 1202.
92
Adler, supra note 20, at 529.
93 THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 464 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke, ed., 1961).
James Iredell, later an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, made the identical point in
the North Carolina Ratifying Convention. 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 69, at 107-08.
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the government. 94 By the late 1700s, the term had also come to mean, more
generally, measures short of full-scale war that one government waged
against another-known as reprisals. 95 The Framers meant to incorporate
both meanings, and traditional letters of marque and reprisal were relied on
during the United States' early wars when our naval forces were relatively
weak or virtually non-existent. 96 By providing Congress with the authority to
issue such letters, the Framers gave Congress not only power over the
initiation of warfare, but also over the conduct of naval warfare, in particular
the power to determine who would be authorized to fight on behalf of the
government, and the scope of and limitations on their authorization.
The Framers assigned Congress the bulk of the federal government's war
powers in large measure because of their fears of an unchecked wartime
President. Again and again the Framers emphasized that the dangers of
Executive aggrandizement inherent in warfare were to be checked by
separating the sword and the purse and vesting control of raising and
supporting armies in Congress. 97 Madison argued the power of the purse was
"the most compl[ete] and effectual weapon with which any constitution can
arm the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of
every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutory
measure." 9 8 The Framers' specific intent that the power of the purse was to
be a broad substantive check to control military activity is not only apparent
in the remarks of the Framers, but in the Constitution's text, which
supplemented the general legislative appropriation power with the specific
power provided to Congress to raise and support armies and navies, a
provision which could be seen as unnecessary but for the Framers' desire to
emphasize and ensure that the means for controlling the Executive in
wartime would be placed in Congress's hands. 99
Moreover, in the debates at the ratifying conventions, the Federalists
countered the Antifederalist argument that the President could become a
military despot by emphasizing that Congress was provided substantial
powers to check the President's Commander in Chief power. Federalist
George Nichols argued in the Virginia Convention that "[t]he President is to
94Jules Lobel, Covert War and Congressional Authority: Hidden War and

ForgottenPower, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1035, 1043-44 (1986).
95
96

Id. at 1044.
Id. at 1044-45;

see also Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, International Law and

ConstitutionalInterpretation:The Commander in ChiefClause Reconsidered, 106 MICH.
L. REv. 61,91-94 (2007).
97

WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-HANsEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND THE

POWER OF THE PURSE 30-31 (1994); Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 45, at 896-97.
98 THE FEDERALIST No. 58, at 394 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961).
99
See Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 45, at 890-99 (arguing that the power of
the purse in national security matters was a substantive, not procedural, power).
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command. But the regulation of the army and navy is given to Congress. Our
representatives will be a powerful check here." 100 Madison claimed that
Congress's funding and other war powers would provide a sufficient check
on the President's war powers because "[t]he purse is in the hands of the
Representatives of the people. They have the appropriation of all moniesThey have the direction and regulation of land and naval forces."' 10 1 So too,
in the North Carolina Ratifying Convention, James Iredell argued that while
the President is to command the military forces, that power "will be found to
be sufficiently guarded," because Congress had been given many of the war
powers of the British king. 10 2 Richard Spaight, who had been a delegate to
the Convention, argued that Congress could control the Commander in Chief
because it alone had the power to raise and support armies. 10 3 Professor John
Yoo summarizes this ratification history by arguing that "as commander-inchief, the President would have the initiative in matters of war, but Congress
10 4
could use its appropriations power to enforce its own policies."'
As a textual matter, the powers of the British king that were provided to
Congress permit Congress to interfere with the President's conduct of
military campaigns. Congressional power to "make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces"'1 5 clearly may be
used to limit the President's power to conduct military campaigns. To the
extent that Congress can prescribe the mode of behavior for the armed forces
it can tell the military how it can and cannot conduct warfare. This power
could severely limit the permissible tactics a President may order during a
military campaign. So too, the constitutional text that grants Congress power
to "make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water" affords Congress
great discretion in determining how the military shall detain, interrogate, and
try captured enemy soldiers.' 0 6 Undoubtedly most importantly, the power to
raise and support an army and navy was believed by the Framers to provide a
"complete" check on the President's power to conduct warfare. In short, the
grant of powers to Congress that were traditionally exercised by the king
contradicts the view that the President's power as Commander in Chief is
immune from congressional interference.
10 0

DocUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
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(State Historical Society of Wisconsin 1990) (John P. Kamiski & Gaspare J. Saladino
eds.) (speech of June 14, 1788).
101 Id.at 1282 (speech of June 14, 1788) (emphasis added).
102 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 69, at 107-08.
103Id.at 114.
104 John C. Yoo, War and the ConstitutionalText, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1639, 1660
(2002).
105 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
106 Id.
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B. Early History, The Quasi-War with France
Our first war with a European power subsequent to the Constitution's
ratification, the undeclared so-called Quasi-War with France in the 1790s,
illustrates Congress's use of its power to control the conduct of warfare. In
response to increasing tensions between the United States and France,
Congress enacted a series of carefully calibrated measures authorizing the
President to conduct limited warfare against France. In May 1798, Congress
authorized the President to act against armed vessels that had committed or
were attempting to commit "depredations" on vessels belonging to U.S.
citizens and to retake captured ships belonging to U.S. citizens. 10 7 In June
1798, Congress authorized private armed vessels of U.S. citizens to use force
to defend against any "search, restraint or seizure" made by armed French
vessels against them. 10 8 Less than a month later, Congress permitted the
President to use U.S. naval vessels and grant special commissions to U.S.
owners of private ships to subdue and seize and capture any armed French
vessel within the jurisdiction of the United States or on the high seas. 10 9 In
1799, Congress provided the President with the power to seize American
vessels bound for French ports.' 10
The Quasi-War with France led to a series of Supreme Court opinions in
which the Court held that Congress could limit the President's power to
conduct hostilities. In Little v. Barreme, a unanimous Court upheld the
imposition of damages against a naval commander who had acted pursuant to
a presidential order to seize a ship that he believed was illegally trading with
France." 1 I Chief Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court recognized that the
President might have inherent power as Commander in Chief to seize vessels
illegally trading with the enemy in a time of war. 112 Yet Congress had at least
implicitly prohibited such military action when it authorized the President to
seize ships traveling to French ports but did not provide similar authority for
1 13
ships bound from a French port, as was the ship involved in this case.
Marshall accepted that President Adams's construction of that statuteauthorizing naval commanders to seize ships both going to and coming from
French ports-was undoubtedly preferable from a military standpoint and
1 14
would provide more effective enforcement of the embargo against France.
107 Act of May 28, 1798, ch. XLVIII, 1 Stat. 561 (1798).
108 Act of June 25, 1798, ch. LX § 1, 1 Stat. 572 (1798).

109 Act of July 9, 1798, ch. LXVIII §§ 1.2, 1 Stat. 578-79 (1798).
110 Act of Feb. 9, 1799, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 613 (1799).
111 Little v. Barreme (The Flying Fish), 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
112Id. at 177-78.
l14Id at 179.
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Nonetheless, the Court enforced the law's limitation on the President's power
to conduct military operations and imposed individual liability on the naval
commander for following President Adams's illegal instructions. 115
The Court's opinion in Little v. Barreme enforcing a legislative
circumscription of the President's Commander in Chief powers in wartime is
supported by several other cases arising out of the undeclared war with
France. In Bas v. Tingy, the Court unanimously held that France was an
enemy for purposes of a law that permitted the salvage of enemy ships,
despite the absence of a declaration of war. 1 16 Three of the four Justices who
wrote seriatim opinions agreed that, in the words of Justice Chase, "Congress
is empowered to declare a general war, or Congress may wage a limited war;
limited in place, in objects, and in time." '1 17 As Justice Washington stated, a
limited, undeclared war is known as an imperfect war, and "those who are
authorised to commit hostilities, act under special authority, and can go no
farther than to the extent of their commission."'118 Justice Paterson also
agreed that an undeclared or imperfect war was nonetheless war, in which
"[a]s far as congress tolerated and authorised the war on our part, so far may
we proceed in hostile operations." 119 In authorizing warfare against the
French, Congress had severely limited the tactics President Adams could
utilize; he was not authorized "to commit hostilities on land; to capture
unarmed French vessels, nor even to capture French armed vessels, lying in a
12 0
French port.'
The next year, in Talbot v. Seeman, Chief Justice Marshall reiterated the
12 1
basic principle articulated by Justices Chase, Washington, and Paterson.
Marshall wrote that "[t]he whole powers of war being, by the constitution of
the United States, vested in Congress, the acts of that body can alone be
resorted to as our guides" in determining whether Captain Talbot had a
lawful right to seize an armed vessel commanded and manned by
Frenchmen. 22 Writing for a unanimous Court, Marshall recognized, as had
Chase, Washington, and Paterson in Bas, that Congress may authorize either
a general war or a limited, partial war.
These early cases contradict a broad claim of inherent Executive power
over the conduct of warfare that Congress cannot interfere with. If Congress
can deny the President the power to capture vessels believed to be trading
5 Id

116 Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800).
117 Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
118 Id. at 40 (emphasis added).

119 Id. at 45.
120 Id. at 43.
121 Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801).
122 Id. at

28.
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with the enemy in a time of war, surely Congress can also regulate and limit
the detention and interrogation of enemy combatants in a time of war. That
Congress can proscribe certain military tactics in enforcing a trade embargo
in a time of war means that it has the power to regulate and limit military
tactics in wartime. As Chief Justice Marshall suggests, in the absence of
legislation, the Commander in Chief's power would normally extend to
capturing such vessels.
The Little case also indicates that Congress's regulation of military
tactics can extend to and intrude on the President's tactical battlefield
decisions. The "battlefield" of the 1790s Quasi-War with France was the high
seas. Which ships should be targeted for capture is a tactical, battlefield
decision. The Court, however, held that Congress could limit the Commander
in Chief's power, even if the President believed such limitations interfered
with his prosecution of the war, as Adams undoubtedly did in that case.
More generally, the Court held that Congress has the power to authorize
limited, undeclared war in which the President's power as Commander in
Chief would be restricted. In such wars, the Commander in Chief's power
would extend no further than Congress had authorized. As President Adams
recognized, Congress had as a functional matter "declared war within the
meaning of the Constitution" against France, but "under certain restrictions
and limitations."'1 23 Under this generally accepted principle in our early
constitutional history, Congress could limit the type of armed forces used, the
number of such forces available, the weapons that could be utilized, the
theaters of actions, and the rules of combat. In short, it could dramatically
restrict the President's power to conduct the war.
Subsequent congressional authorizations of the use of force reinforced
this basic principle that Congress can authorize full or limited warfare as it
chooses. Throughout the nineteenth century, Congress repeatedly authorized
the President to use limited force against other nations, slave traders, and
pirates. 124 When President Madison requested on June 1, 1812, that Congress
consider declaring war, the House voted quickly to declare war. The Senate,
however, considered limiting its authorization to war on the high seas, and a
motion was passed to return the bill declaring war to the committee to
125
authorize only warships and privateers to make reprisals against Britain.
However, when the modified bill limiting the war to the high seas was
123 FISHER, supra note 20, at 24 (citing 9 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 81 (Charles
Francis Adams ed., 1854)).
124
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, CongressionalAuthorization and the
War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2073 (2005). As Professors Bradley and
Goldsmith point out, most authorizations to use force in U.S. history have been of a
limited, partial nature. Id.
125 FISHER, supra note 20, at 38; DONALD R. HICKEY, THE WAR OF 1812, A

FORGOTTEN CONFLICT 44-46 (1989).
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reported back for final action, it was defeated by a tie vote. 126 The Senate
finally approved the declaration of war by a vote of 19-13.127 The declaration
of war authorized the President to use "the whole land and naval force of the
128
United States."
In declarations of war after 1812, Congress continued the practice of
providing that the President is authorized and directed to employ the entire
1 30
naval and military forces of the United States 129 against the enemy nation.
These authorizations of force are all premised on congressional power to
either authorize a partial, limited war or a full war. Particularly in the context
of the debate in the Senate as to whether to authorize limited warfare against
Britain in 1812, the best explanation for the language in all of these
declarations of war directing the President to employ the entire military force
of the United States is that the declaration of war did not automatically give
the President unlimited power to use all the armed forces of the United
States. Congress could limit the methods and means of warfare, and therefore
determined to explicitly grant the President broad authority.
During the Quasi-War with France, Congress also significantly narrowed
the President's discretion to give orders to soldiers. The original laws for the
regulation of the military had directed soldiers "to observe and obey the
orders of the President of the United States." 13 1 In 1800, Congress amended

126 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 270-71 (1812).
127Id. at 297-98.
128 Act of June 18, 1812, ch. 102, 2 Stat. 755 (1812).
129 See J. Res. of December 11, 1941, ch. 564, 55 Stat. 796 (World War II:
Germany); J. Res. of June 5, 1942, ch. 325, 56 Stat. 307 (World War II: Rumania); J.
Res. of June 5, 1942, ch. 324, 56 Stat. 307 (World War II: Hungary); J. Res. of June 5,
1942, ch. 323, 56 Stat. 307 (World War 11: Bulgaria); J. Res. of Dec. 11, 1941, ch. 565,
55 Stat. 797 (World War II: Italy); J. Res. of Dec. 8, 1941, ch. 561, 55 Stat. 795 (World
War II: Japan) (identical to German resolution except for identity of enemy); J. Res. of
Dec. 7, 1917, ch. 1, 40 Stat. 429 (World War I: Austro-Hungary); J. Res. of Apr. 6, 1917,
ch. 1, 40 Stat. 1 (World War I: Germany); Act of Apr. 25, 1898, ch. 189, 30 Stat. 364
("[The President is] directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the
United States."); Act of May 13, 1846, ch. 16, 9 Stat. 9.
130 Professors Goldsmith and Bradley note that all of the U.S. declarations of war
expressly distinguish the declaration from the authorization to use force, and also point
out that no one has ever analyzed the significance of this distinction. Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 124, at 2047, 2063-64. They suggest that one reason for this
practice may stem from the fact that a declaration of war may not have served the
function of providing congressional authorization for the President to use military force.
Id. at 2064-66. Here I suggest a related reason: that Congress can limit the President's
use of force even when it declares war, and that conversely, Congress wanted to make
clear that it was authorizing and directing the President to employ the entire military
force.
131 Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 25, § 3, 1 Stat. 95, 96.
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the duty to obey commands to specifically prohibit soldiers from executing
unlawful orders issued by superior officers. 132 It follows that today Congress
could use its power to make rules for the government and regulation of the
armed forces to prohibit military officers from obeying and executing a
specific order such as to torture a prisoner, to use waterboarding or any other
techniques deemed inhumane against a prisoner, or to deploy a particular
weapon to engage in any tactic or method of war Congress deemed
13 3
inappropriate.
Congress also extensively debated whether the President had sole power
as Commander in Chief over at least some aspects of the conduct of the
Quasi-War with France. A number of Federalist members of Congress took
the position that Congress could not restrict the President's power to use
naval vessels outside U.S. territorial waters or as convoys. 13 4 Congressman
Harrison Gray Otis argued that
[i]f a naval force was raised, it would rest with the President how it should
be employed, as he was commander-in-chief. The Legislature could say
whether the vessels should be employed offensively or defensively, but to
say at what precise place they were to be stationed, was interfering with the
135
duty of the commander-in-chief.
Similarly, Congressman Robert Harper contended that Congress had no
"right to direct the public force."' 136 If for example, "we were at war with
Great Britain, [Congress] should have no right to say to the President, attack
Canada or the Islands.' 3 7
The Republicans argued back that Congress had the power to limit and
define the objects with which and upon which the naval vessels could be
employed, and that (in defining those objects) Congress could dictate where
the President could place the vessels and the uses he could make of them. For
(1800), art. 14.
133 Indeed, during the Civil War, Congress amended the Article of War to prohibit
any U.S. officer or soldier from "employing any of the forces under their respective
commands for the purpose of returning fugitives from service or labor." Act of Mar. 13,
1862, ch. 40, § 1, 12 .Stat. 354.
134 In June 1797 Republicans sought to limit the employment of U.S. naval vessels
to "within the jurisdiction of the United States" and to prevent their use of convoys
132 2 Stat. 97

outside United States waters. See 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 289, 294, 368 (1797) (Sen. Albert
Gallatin, William B. Giles, and John Williams, respectively). See generally SOFAER,
supra note 75, at 148-50 for a discussion of the Republican proposals and Federalist
objections.
135 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 290 (1797).
136 Id.at 364.
137 Id.
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example, Congressman John Nicholas denied the right of the President to
apply the naval force of the United States to any object he pleased:
When a force was raised for a particular object, [it was the President's]
business to direct the manner in which this force should be used; but to say
he had the right to apply it at his discretion, was to make him master of the
United States; if that were the case, he said, the powers of that House were
gone ....
He insisted upon it that they had a right to say the vessels should
be kept in the river Delaware, if they pleased; the President might
afterwards direct their conduct. 13 8
Republican leader Albert Gallatin distinguished between "the
Constitutional power of the President as Commander-in-Chief to command,
and the Legislative application of any force which may be raised by the
United States." 139 For Gallatin, there was
an essential distinction between the power to command and the application
of a force. To command is certainly subordinate to applying the force. The

President of the United States is Commander-in-Chief of the Militia of the
United States; but when that Militia is raised, it is to be applied in a manner

40
specifically directed by law.1

In Gallatin's view, then, the President's power to command was
subordinate to congressional authority to determine how the force he
commanded should be applied. In short, Gallatin's argument distinguished
between the power to command and the substantive power to decide how and
by what means warfare should be conducted.
A number of prominent Federalists did not disagree with Gallatin's basic
distinction. Both Otis and another Federalist, Samuel W. Dana, agreed that
Congress had the "right to define the object" of the naval vessels, but argued
that it was not "convenient" to do so. 1 4 1 Otis advanced a theory of concurrent
power which was in some respects similar to that of Gallatin. "The President
is Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and of the Militia when called out," he
argued, "but Congress might, nevertheless, direct the use of them."'1 42 Otis
believed that the President had the power to use the naval vessels as convoys
in the absence of congressional direction, "yet it does not follow that the
Legislature shall not point out the particular manner in which [the naval
vessels] shall be employed, and under what restrictions convoys shall or shall
138 Id.at 362.
139 Id.at 1456.
140 Id. (emphasis

added).
365-66 (1797).
1460 (1798).

141 5 ANNALS OF CONG.
142 5 ANNALS OF CONG.
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not be granted."' 143 Both Otis's and Gallatin's positions would provide
Congress substantial power to control the conduct of a war, including the
manner in which naval vessels or armies would be deployed.
The House debate on the deployment of naval vessels during the 1790s,
while instructive of arguments made as to Congress's power to control the
conduct of war, ended inconclusively. First, it was unclear whether members
of Congress voted based on their constitutional positions, or whether they
agreed with Congressmen Otis, Dana, and others that restrictions on the
President's power might be lawful, but inexpedient. Second, the House itself
acted seemingly inconsistently; it voted to reject Republicans' efforts to
restrict the use of naval vessels to within the U.S. seacoast, and then
essentially reversed its position the next day, adopting restrictions limiting
the use of certain naval vessels to defending the seacoast and repelling any
hostility towards vessels and commerce within their jurisdiction. 144
In any event, two conclusions are clear from our experience during the
first war with a European power after the adoption of the Constitution. First,
on various occasions Congress regulated the President's conduct of the war,
in some cases in great detail. Congress told the President which ships he
could capture on the high seas; 145 limited his use of some ships to protecting
commerce within our seacoast; 146 regulated in minute detail the personnel the
President could deploy on each frigate of the United States; 147 "required" the
President to "cause the most rigorous retaliation" on French citizens who
mistreated captured American citizens; 14 8 enacted detailed regulations for the
Navy proscribing the maltreatment or other abuse of any civilian while on
shore; 149 provided detailed instructions for the detainment of prisoners
14 3

Id.

144 See An Act providing Naval Armament, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 523 (1797) (expired); 5
ANNALS OF CONG. 370 (1797) (statement of Rep. Sitgreaves) ("He was at a loss to
account for the change of sentiment in the House since yesterday. He thought it was then
the opinion that they ought to provide the force; and when provided, leave it to the
disposal of the Executive, and that, if he thought proper to employ the frigates in the
protection of our commerce beyond the jurisdiction line, he should be authorized to do
so."); SOFAER, supra note 75, at 148. In addition, the House voted at times to restrict the
vessels' use as convoys, but the Senate refused to concur, resulting in a compromise bill
without the restriction. Id. at 150.
145 Little v. Barreme (The Flying Fish), 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
146 An Act providing Naval Armament, 1 Stat. at 525.
147 Id. at 524 ("That there shall be employed on board each of the ships of forty-four
guns, one captain, four lieutenants, two lieutenants of marines, one chaplain, one surgeon,
and two surgeon's mates .... ").
148 An Act vesting the power of retaliation, in certain cases, in the President of the

United States, ch. 45, 1 Stat. 743 (1799).
149 An Act for the better government of the Navy of the United States, ch. 33, 2 Stat.
45,48 (1800).
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captured on board French vessels; 150 and authorized the President to grant
special, limited commissions to the owners of private armed ships of the
United States to capture certain armed French vessels. 15 1 Secondly, the
Supreme Court clearly affirmed Congress's power to restrict the President's
conduct of warfare. As Abraham Sofaer points out, "[t]he Supreme Court
made clear that it regarded Congress as the ultimate source of authority on
whether and how the nation would make war. Both branches could act.., but
152
Congress had the final say."
C. Civil War
The Civil War revived questions of congressional power over the
conduct of warfare. At the outset of the war, frustrated with the delay of
military action against the confederate army in Virginia, Republican Senator
Lyman Trumbull pressed in a senatorial caucus a resolution directing an
immediate movement of troops towards Richmond before July 20, 1861.153
Reportedly backed by a group of fifteen Senators, but rejected in the caucus,
President Lincoln was told that unless action was taken promptly, the
resolution would eventually be forced through. 154 Shortly thereafter, the
Army under General Irvin McDowell did launch a campaign towards
Richmond, which made Trumbull's effort moot and resulted in the defeat at
the first Battle of Bull Run.
The Radical Republicans' dissatisfaction with the conduct of the Union
war effort led them to establish the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the
War. 155 That committee was accused of interineddling in military affairs, and
General Robert E. Lee is reported to have remarked that the committee's
efforts were worth two Army divisions to the Confederacy. 156 Despite these
accusations, the committee took no legislative action to interfere with
military campaigns, confining its work primarily to investigations of military
corruption, negligence, and disastrous military decisions, which were well
within congressional power. 157 While the committee and various members of
150 An Act to further protect the Commerce of the United States, ch. 68, 1 Stat. 578,

580 (1798).
151 Id. at 579:
152 SOFAER, supra note 75, at 166 (emphasis added).
15 3

A.

HOWARD

MENEELY,
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WAR

DEPARTMENT,

1861:

A

STUDY

IN

MOBILIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION 1867 (1928).
15 4 Id.
15 5
See generally BRUCE TAP, OVER LINCOLN's SHOULDER: THE COMMIrEE ON THE
CONDUCT OF THE WAR (1998).
156 DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN

258 (1992).
157 TAP, supra note 155, at 2-9 (pointing out that the Committee gained notoriety

for its wide-ranging investigations).
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Congress sought to pressure Lincoln and the Union generals on military
matters, Lincoln skillfully parried their pressure, compromising when
necessary, but avoiding open confrontation.
The most extensive debate in Congress over the respective war powers of
the President and Congress came over legislation to confiscate the property
158
and free the slaves of rebels, known as the Second Confiscation Act.
Introduced by Senator Trumbull in January 1862, the original bill provided
for the forfeit of real and personal property of rebels who either were in the
Confederate armies or provided "aid and comfort" to the rebellion; declared
the slaves of such individuals to be free; and instructed the President to use
the military to confiscate property in districts that were "beyond the reach of
civil process" because of the rebellion when he believed that military
159
necessity or the safety, interest and welfare of the United States required.
At the time Trumbull introduced his bill, Lincoln was not in favor of
immediately emancipating slaves or confiscating rebel property, and in fact
he revoked orders by Army generals such as General David Hunter that
160
purported to free slaves.
Some conservative Republican and Democratic Senators opposed to
widespread confiscation and emancipation raised strong constitutional
objections to the proposed legislation, including the argument that it
improperly interfered with the President's prerogatives as Commander in
Chief. They contended that the President, not Congress, possessed the power
to order confiscation as he deemed militarily necessary.' 61 Senator Edgar
Cowan argued that the Act was unconstitutional because, inter alia, the
Constitution declares that the President is Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy, "investing him with the war-making power," and "[h]e is the
commander directing and controlling it as he pleases, and only restrained in
so far by Congress in that he must depend upon them to foot his bills and
authorize his levies." 162 Senator Orville Browning claimed that "the warexecuting powers are vested in the President, in the executive department of
the Government, and Congress has no more right to touch them or exercise
them than it has to usurp and exercise the judicial functions of the
Government."' 163 "Congress can no more command the Army, or interfere
158 An Act to suppress Insurrection, to punish Treason and Rebellion, to seize and
confiscate the Property of Rebels, and for other Purposes, ch. 195, 12 Stat. 589 (1862).
159 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 942 (1862).
16 0 SILVANA R. SIDDALI,

FROM PROPERTY TO PERSON:

SLAVERY AND

THE

CONFISCATION ACTS, 1861-1862, at 99-108, 182-83 (2005).
161 See generally ALLAN G. BOGuE, THE EARNEST MEN: REPUBLICANS OF THE CIVIL
WAR SENATE 221, 224-25 (1981); SIDDALI, supra note 160, at 120-66.
162 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1052 (1862).
163 Id.at 1137.
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with the command of it when in the field, than it can adjudicate a case at law
or control the decisions of a court." 164
Opponents of the bill articulated several broad principles to support
Congress's lack of power over the conduct of war. The first was that the
conduct of war was governed by international law-the laws of war-and
that those laws of war were to be executed by the President and not
Congress. This position viewed the Constitution as granting the President the
right and privilege to conduct war once Congress authorized hostilitiesguided only by the common laws of war, which could not be violated,
modified, or supplemented by statute. Senator Browning and other Senators
argued that the law of nations provided all of the rules governing the types of
enemy property subject to confiscation. The only question left unresolved
was the manner of execution of those laws-a task performed by the
President as Commander in Chief, not Congress. 165 Browning read the
Constitution to permit Congress or the President to take only actions
166
prosecuting the war that were in conformity with the law of nations.
Moreover, under the law of nations "[a]ll conceivable emergencies are
provided for. We need not legislate to meet them. It is only necessary that the
167
laws shall be executed."'
Browning and other Senators were correct that the Framers of the
Constitution understood international law to be binding on Congress in the
same way that the Constitution was, and believed Congress without
constitutional power to alter or contravene those laws. 168 Nonetheless, the
opposition's war powers theory according the President sole power to
implement and execute international law was subject to several obvious
difficulties. Their theory essentially rendered superfluous many congressional
war powers, especially the power to make rules concerning captures on land
164Id. at 1136.
165
Id.at 1857.
166 Id.To Browning and other opponents, captures on land and sea were not "subject
to the control of municipal laws, unless such municipal laws conform to the laws of
nations, and then they are of force only because of such conformity." Id.
167 ld. at 1857-58. Senator Edgar Cowan argued that "[i]n the conduct of the civil
war now waging in this country, the President is guided and controlled by these laws, nor
has the Congress any power whatever to alter or change them, and bind him by so doing,
against his consent .... Id. at 1052. See also Senator John B. Henderson's arguments to
same effect. Id.at 1573.
168 Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign
Policy and InternationalLaw, 71 VA. L. REv. 1071, 1084 (1985). Indeed, Lincoln's
Attorney General explicitly affirmed that constitutional principle, as did several Justices
of the Supreme Court in the aftermath of the Civil War. Id. at 1108-10. By the twentieth
century, Congress's power to enact legislation in violation of international law became
well established, at least with respect to non-fundamental norms of international law. See
Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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and water. For, according to the opposition, all the rules concerning such
captures were already contained in the laws of war and required executive,
169
not congressional, execution.
More fundamentally, the opposition's law of nations theory ignored the
problem that wide swaths of warfare were either totally unregulated by the
laws of war, regulated by vague rules, or left to the discretion of each nation.
In particular, the Supreme Court had already pointed out in Brown v. United
States that the power to confiscate enemy alien property was not mandatory
under the law of nations but rather was left to the discretion of each
nation. 170 Under our Constitution, that discretion was to be exercised by
Congress. 17 1 In general, international law not only prohibited certain conduct,
but also gave each nation certain rights, and Congress could decide whether
to exercise those rights or not. Finally, when international law was vaguewhich was not infrequent-Congress was given the power not only to punish
172
offenses against the law of nations, but also to define such offenses.
In response to this problem, conservative Senators articulated a second,
related theory justifying absolute Presidential power over the conduct of war.
To the extent that the laws of war were discretionary, they argued that their
application depended on judgments as to the military necessity of a particular
measure such as the capture of enemy property. But according to these
Senators, the judgment of military necessity was, by its nature, an executive
rather than a legislative function. 173 As Senator Jacob Collamer argued, "I
insist that the Executive, his generals, the military power, are the sole judges
of what is military necessity."' 174 This argument ignored the many decisions
involving determinations of military necessity explicitly given to Congress:
whether to raise an army or navy for the nation's defense, how many soldiers
and sailors to provide, whether to authorize private persons to conduct
hostilities, and, more particularly, what enemy property should be
confiscated.
The opposition also attempted to analogize the President's powers to
those of the English king. Senator Cowan argued that congressional power
was

169 Senator Henderson claimed that Congress could enact procedural rules for the
condemnation of property, "but cannot determine what is or what is not the subject of
capture." CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1573 (1862). But there seems no reason to
distinguish between congressional power to determine the property subject to be captured
and the process used to effectuate its condemnation as a lawful prize of war.
170 Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 128-29 (1814).
171 Id.
172
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
17 3
See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1858 (1862).
174MI. at 1810.
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precisely the power which the English Parliament has over the English army
in the field, and no more; and the President, in the command of the Army,
and in directing its operations, is, in my humble judgment, just as supreme
and as independent of any direction from Congress, or the judiciary, or
anybody else, as the King of Great Britain is in the command of the armies
75
of Great Britain. 1
Here Cowan was simply in error; as Hamilton had pointed out in The
FederalistPapers,the President was not given the same power over warfare
176
as the King of Great Britain.
Finally, the opponents of the Confiscation Bill fell back on the same
analogical reasoning that Bush Administration officials have employed: that
the power to deploy troops on the battlefield leads to the logical conclusion
that the entire conduct of the war is within the President's sole power. As
Senator Browning put it,
Has Congress anything whatever to do with it [confiscation]? Just as well
might Congress claim the right to tell the general on the field of battle when
to advance and when to withdraw a column, and when the bayonet should
be substituted for the musket and the rifle. These are not legislative
functions, but executive. So is the seizure and confiscation of the property
of a public enemy on land in time of war executive. It is not the making, but
177
the executing of a law.
Radical proponents of the bill, as well as moderate Republicans who
supported compromise, argued forcefully that Congress had virtually
absolute power to control the conduct of the war, and that the President's
power merely entitled him to act in the absence of legislation. Senator
Trumbull argued that
there is not a syllable in the Constitution conferring on the President war
powers .... As Commander-in-Chief when an army is raised, in the
absence of any rules adopted by Congress for its government, he would
have the right to control it, in the prosecution of the war, according to his
discretion, not violating the established rules of civilized warfare ....178
For Trumbull, "When armies and navies are raised by Congress, of
which the President is, by the Constitution, made Commander-in-Chief, he
can only govern and regulate them as Congress shall direct ....,,179 Senator
175Id.at 1879.
176
THE FEDERALIST No. 74, supra note 73, at 500.
177 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1858 (1862).
178 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1559 (1862).
179 Id.
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Justin Morrill similarly claimed that there is "no limit on the power of
Congress; but it is invested with the absolute powers of war," "the whole
power of war," "an unrestricted power."'180 Senator Charles Sumner
responded to Browning that "there is not one of the rights of war which
Congress may not invoke. There is not a single weapon in its terrible arsenal
which Congress may not grasp."'' Senator Jacob Howard was even more
explicit that Congress had complete control over the conduct of warfare, with
the exception that it cannot supersede the President in the chief command:
For if it be the exclusive right of Congress not only to raise and support
armies and navies, but (which is an irresistible and immediate inference) to
use and employ them for warlike purposes, they must possess also the
power to control every movement of the Army and Navy in actual service,
whenever they shall see fit so to do. They cannot indeed supersede the
President in the chief command, but they possess the undoubted power
under the Constitution to subject him to their own orders as to the objects of
the war, its extent and duration, the contingencies upon which it shall cease
or be resumed, the means of annoyance or defense that may be employed,
and, in short, the entire use which he shall make of the military forces of the
country. 182

Moderate Republicans generally agreed with Trumbull, Morill, Sumner,
and Howard. Senator John Sherman, a moderate Republican who introduced
an amendment to Trumbull's bill to narrow its scope, did not agree with the
opposition's view of war powers. For him, the President could conduct the
war "only in the manner and in the mode we may prescribe by law." 183 "It is
the duty of Congress to declare war, to raise armies, to equip navies, to make
rules and regulations governing war, and the President has no power except
simply, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, to execute those
laws." 184 And some members of Congress, such as Representative Frank
Blair, argued that congressional power over emancipation or confiscation did
not stem primarily from the Capture Clause but was an "incident of the
85
general war power of Congress."1
Senator Benjamin Wade answered Browning and Cowan's argument that
Congress could not interfere with the President's command of battlefield
180Id. at 1076. See also id. at 1875 (Sen. Wilmot).
181Id. at 2918.
182 Id. at 1718. Senator John Hale admitted that there were some express powers of

the President, such as the pardon power, with which Congress could not interfere, but
rejected the notion that the Commander in Chief power was one of them. Id. at 2928.
183 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1784 (1862).

184 Id. at 1784.
185 Id. at 2300.
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operations, arguing that although it would be foolish for Congress to interfere
with the President's power to command in the field, Congress nonetheless
had the constitutional authority to do so:
Undoubtedly and unquestionably Congress is not going to interfere with the
command of a general in the field before the enemy; they are not going to
say to him, you shall march such a brigade to such a place, and you shall
countermarch another, and you shall advance and retreat, and you shall
intrench, and you shall pull down your intrenchments, you shall assail the
enemy to-morrow, and you shall retreat from him the next day. I do not
doubt that Congress, if they were foolish enough, have power even to
regulate that; but it would be as foolish as anything could be to attempt
such an interference with a general, a commander-in-chief in the field.

Nobody contemplates any such thing; but we may lay down the principles
on which the war shall be prosecuted; we may enact a law to-day, if we
will, declaring that the Army shall take no prisoners. Of course the greater
186
includes the less.
In the end, the argument that Congress had the war power to provide for
the confiscation of Confederate property carried the day. Large majorities in
the Senate and House of Representatives voted for the Second Confiscation
Act, enacted on July 17, 1862.187 Due process and other constitutional and
political objections forced Trumbull and the other radicals to accept a
compromise version of the bill that watered down some of the most forceful
provisions in Trumbull's original bill. However, the legislation still imposed
duties on the President that Cowan, Browning, and others had argued were
inconsistent with his power as Commander in Chief. For example, Section 5
required the President "to cause the seizure of all the estate and property,
money, stocks, credit and effects" of certain classes of Confederate leaders,
while Section 6 required that within sixty days after a public proclamation by
the President warning all persons to cease to aid and abet rebellion, it would
be "the duty of the President" to seize property of rebels who did not comply.
Section 7 required the army to free all fugitive slaves of rebels who took
refuge within the lines of the army and all slaves of rebels captured by the
188
army.
186 Id. at 2930 (emphasis added).

187 Second Confiscation Act, ch. 195, 12 Stat. 589 (1862). The vote on the final bill
was 28-13 in the Senate and 82-42 in the House. See

SIDDALI,

supra note 160. In the

Senate, even some who had argued that Congress had no power to pass legislation in this
whole area, such as Senators Cowan and Collamer, voted for the bill.
188 SIDDALI, supra note 160, at 91. Indeed, Lincoln threatened to veto the bill unless
Congress made clear-which it eventually did-that the Act would not "work a forfeiture
of the real estate of the offender beyond his natural life." CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3374 (1862); BOGUE, supra note 161, at 234.
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The bill was forced upon a reluctant President who had wanted Congress
to wait until he recommended these measures. 189 According to Congressman
James G. Blaine, Lincoln did not object to the legislation in principle, but
thought it was ill-timed and premature, and signed the law reluctantly.
Indeed, the bill's opponents challenged Congress's constitutional power to
provide for confiscation, in part because they recognized that Lincoln was
hesitant to interfere with the rebels' property rights. 190 Lincoln promulgated
the proclamation required by the statute but never vigorously enforced the
statute, and by the end of the war less than $2 million in property had been
confiscated from the rebels. 191 But the principle that Congress could decide
whether the government should use confiscation of enemy property as a
92
tactic of warfare had been clearly established.1
After the Civil War ended, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Confiscation Act, employing broad language that
mirrored the Republican arguments that accorded Congress virtually
unlimited power to control the conduct of war. 193 The Court held that the
congressional "power to declare war involves the power to prosecute it by all
94
means and in any manner in which war may be legitimately prosecuted."'
The Court therefore agreed with those members of Congress who located
congressional power to seize and confiscate the property of an enemy within
the general power to declare war. Moreover, the Court claimed that "[i]f there
were any uncertainty respecting the existence of such a right it would be set
at rest by the express grant of power to make rules respecting captures on
195
land and water."
1891 JAMES G. BLAINE, TWENTY YEARS OF CONGRESS: FROM LINCOLN TO GARFIELD

343 (1884).
190 SIDDALI, supra note 160, at 138.
191 SIDDALI, supra note 160, at 238-39. While the courts handled a considerable
number of confiscation cases under the statute, very little property was actually
confiscated under the Act. JAMES G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER

LINCOLN 288-91 (1926). In large part this was due to the compromise nature of the
statute, its lack of a strong enforcement mechanism, and Lincoln's reluctance to strongly
enforce it. SIDALLI, supra note 160, at 245-47.
192War Department Solicitor William Whiting affirmed congressional power to
order emancipation and confiscation in an important study published in 1863. WILLIAM
WHITING, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS

(Boston, John L. Shorey 2d ed.
1862). Whiting took the position that the President and Congress had concurrent power
over emancipation and confiscation, writing that "[t]he military authority of the President
is not incompatible with the peace or war powers of Congress; but both co-exist, and may
be exercisedupon the same subject." Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
193 Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268 (1871).
IN RELATION TO REBELLION, TREASON AND SLAVERY

194 Id. at 305.

195 Id.
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D. Twentieth Century
Twentieth century Congresses continued to exercise their authority to
limit the President's conduct of authorized hostilities. Congress has regulated
in minute detail the manner in which armed forces may be deployed, enacted
detailed rules governing the conduct of those forces, set forth rules of
engagement, authorized the President to conduct hostilities limited in
geographic scope, time, the type and number of forces that could be used,
and the objects and purposes for which force could be used.
For example, in 1908, Congress enacted a statute barring any expenditure
for the Marine Corps unless Marine Corps officers and enlisted men
constituted at least 8% of the enlisted men on board all battleships and armed
cruisers. 196 The statute overruled a decision by President Theodore Roosevelt
to station Marines on shore and not aboard naval ships. The Navy apparently
had doubts as to the constitutionality of the statute and requested an opinion
from the Attorney General, George W. Wickersham.1 97 Wickersham had "no
doubt" as to the constitutionality of the statute. 198 For "Congress is the sole
judge of how the Army or Navy shall be raised and of what it shall be
composed."' 199 Therefore Congress could constitutionally require that no
funds shall be available for the Marine Corps, "unless the marine corps be
employed in some designated way," and the President was bound to
comply.200

In 1913 Attorney General James McReynolds opined that a Navy
regulation permitting staff officers of the Marine Corps to be detached from
headquarters and given other duties was unlawful because it contravened the
relevant statutes. 20 1 These statutes regulated the armed forces in great detail,
just as the early nineteenth century statutes previously discussed required
specific number of officers and sailors to be deployed on different types of
naval vessels. 20 2 Yet this legislation clearly fell within congressional power
to decide the composition of the armed forces and to enact rules for their
deployment.
More importantly, Congress has authorized the President to use force
numerous times since World War II subject to limitations on scope, time
period, types of force and geographic area. In 1955, Congress authorized the
196 Act of Mar. 3, 1909, ch. 255, 35 Stat. 753, 773-74.
197 27 Op. Att'y Gen. 259 (1909).

198 Id.

199 Id.at 260.

200 Id.

201 30 Op. Att'y Gen. 234 (1913). See also WORMuTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 65, at
96.
202 See supra note 148.
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President to use force against China but limited that authorization only to
"securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed
attack. '20 3 While the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 1964 provided the
President broad authority "to take all necessary measures to repel any armed
attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further
aggression" in Southeast Asia, 2°4 Congress subsequently limited the
President's power to use American forces to fight the war in Indochina. In
response to the escalating ground war in Indochina, Congress provided in the
Department of the Defense Appropriations Act of 1970 that "none of the
funds appropriated by this Act shall be used to finance the introduction of
American ground combat troops into Laos or Thailand. '20 5 That prohibition
was prefaced by the statement that the restriction was "[i]n line with the
expressed intention of the President of the United States." Then Assistant
Attorney General William H. Rehnquist wrote that "the proviso was accepted
by the Executive." 20 6 Rehnquist's memorandum, written when he was in
charge of the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel, supports
congressional power to limit the scope of the President's power to conduct
hostilities. He argued that the notion that Congress "may not delegate a lesser
amount of authority to conduct military operations" than that provided by
unlimited declared war "is both utterly illogical and unsupported by
precedent." 20 7 He recognized that "Congress undoubtedly has the power in
certain situations to restrict the President's power as Commander-in-Chief to
'20 8
a narrower scope than it would have had in the absence of legislation."
Rehnquist strongly suggested that congressional power to control the conduct
of war has constitutional limits, particularly "should Congress attempt by
detailed instructions as to the use of American forces already in the field to
20 9
supersede the President as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces."
However, he neither attempted to draw a clear line between congressional
and presidential authority, nor did he explicitly claim that any such
restrictions would be clearly unconstitutional, but merely that they would not
be free of constitutional doubt.
203 j. Res. of Jan. 29, 1955, Pub. L. No. 4, 69 Stat. 7, cited in Bradley & Goldsmith,
supra note 124, at 2047, 2076-77.
204 j. Res. of Aug. 10, 1964, Pub. L. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384.
205 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1970, Pub. L. 91-171, § 643, 83
Stat. 469, 487 (1969). This prohibition was continued in subsequent appropriation acts.
See, e.g., Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1972, Pub. L. 92-204, § 742, 85
Stat. 716, 735.
206
Rehnquist Memo, supra note 40, at 40; § 643, 83 Stat. at 487.
207 Id. at 18.
208 Id. at 20.

209 Id. at 21.
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After U.S. ground forces entered Cambodia in 1970, Congress debated
and eventually enacted legislation providing that "none of the funds
authorized or appropriated pursuant to this or any other Act may be used to
finance the introduction of United States ground combat troops into
Cambodia, or to provide United States advisers to or for Cambodian military
forces in Cambodia." 210 The President apparently accepted the
constitutionality of the restriction of his power to use ground forces in
21
Cambodia. '
The Cambodian restriction was preceded by a lengthy seven week debate
in the Senate over the Cooper-Church Amendment, which would have
prohibited retaining U.S. forces in Cambodia at a time when the President
still was deploying them there, and would have also prohibited air operations
over Cambodia in support of Cambodian forces. 2 12 A notable aspect of the
debate is that the opposition to the Cooper-Church Amendment on
constitutional grounds generally did not rely on the broad Commander in
Chief power to direct the conduct of the war, but on the President's power as
Commander in Chief to protect the lives of American troops subject to attack
or imminent attack, a power seemingly derived from the President's power to
repel attacks on American territory and armed forces. 2 13 Senator Robert Byrd
successfully introduced language that stated that nothing in the bill was to be
deemed to impugn the constitutional power of the President to take action
"which may be necessary to protect the lives of U.S. armed forces wherever
deployed." 2 14 The Cooper-Church amendment was adopted by the Senate,
215
but failed passage in the House and was not therefore enacted into law.
210 Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, Pub. L. 91-652, § 7a, 84 Stat. 1942,

1943 (1971).
211 Abner J. Mikva & Joseph R. Lundy, The 91st Congress and the Constitution, 38
U. CI. L. REv. 449, 495 (1971). As with the restriction on the use of ground troops in
Thailand and Laos, the Cambodian restriction was prefaced with the phrase "[i]n line
with the expressed intention of the President of the United States," suggesting that the
President was not planning to reintroduce U.S. troops into Cambodia, and had no
constitutional objections to the Amendment. Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 45, at
912.
212 S. REP. No. 91-865, at 9-10 (1970).
213 See, e.g., 116 CONG. REc. 15560, 15561 (1970) (Statement of Sen. Robert Dole).
Id. 20411 (Remarks of Sen. Byrd re: President's power to respond to imminent danger or
emergency situation without time to consult). See generally Mikva & Lundy, supra note
211, at 487-95.
214 The fmal text of the Cooper-Church Amendment is reproduced in THE SENATE'S
WAR PowERs, DEBATE ON CAMBODIA FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL REcoRD 239 (Eugene

P. Dvorin ed., 1970) [hereinafter THE SENATE'S WAR POWERS]. See statement of Senator
Byrd, id. at 190. Also included in the Cooper-Church Amendment as it was eventually
voted on was a proviso that nothing contained in the bill shall be deemed to impugn the
constitutional power of the Congress including the power to declare war and to make
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Congress eventually terminated the Indochina war by cutting off all
funding for the President to continue military operations in Indochina. In
1973, Congress provided that "Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
on or after August 15, 1973, no funds herein or heretofore appropriated may
be obligated or expended to finance directly or indirectly combat activities by
United States military forces in or over or from off the shores of North
'2 16
Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia.
In later years, Congress also limited Executive power to conduct duly
authorized warfare. Congress authorized the President in 1983 to continue
participation by U.S. armed forces in the Multinational Force in Lebanon but
limited the time period of such authorization to eighteen months. 2 17 In
addition, the President's use of armed force in Lebanon was limited to the
performance of the functions specified in and subject to the constraints
imposed by the agreement establishing the Multinational Force in Lebanon,
except that the President could take protective measures necessary for the
safety of that force. 21 8 Three main limitations on the U.S. role were set forth
in that agreement: the number of U.S. troops would be approximately 1,200,
they would operate only in the Beirut area, and they were not expected to
21 9
perform a combat mission except to exercise the right of self-defense.

rules for the government and regulation of the armed forces of the United States. Id.
Some felt that acceptance of the proviso protecting the constitutional power of the
President "'gutted' the entire Cooper-Church effort." Mikva & Lundy, supra note 211, at
491.
215 See ROBERT DAVID JOHNSON, CONGRESS AND THE COLD WAR 164-68 (2006).
Before a compromise was negotiated by the Majority Leader, the Senate had rejected an
amendment offered by Senator Byrd which would have provided that Cooper-Church did
not preclude the President from taking all actions necessary to protect U.S. troops in
South Vietnam. Id.at 166.
2 16
H.R.J. Res. 636, 93d Cong. (1973), Pub. L. No. 93-52 § 108, 87 Stat. 130, 134.
217 S.J. Res. 159, 98th Cong. (1983), Pub. L. No. 98-119, § 6, 97 Stat. 805, 807.
218
Id. § 3, 97 Stat. at 806.
219 S.REP. No. 98-242, at 11 (1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1230, 1240,
1248-49. In signing the legislation, President Reagan claimed that while it was his
intention to consult with Congress, he did not consider himself bound to follow
congressional directives that limited his war powers, including the 60-day limit of the
War Powers Resolution. Statement on Signing S.J. Res. 159 into law, 19 Weekly Comp.
Pres. Doc. 1422-23 (Oct. 17, 1983). However, in a letter to House Speaker Thomas P.
O'Neill, Jr., President Reagan said that it was his "intention to seek congressional
authorization-as contemplated by the Act-if circumstances require any substantial
expansion in the number or role of U.S. armed forces in Lebanon." Letter to
Congressional Leaders on the Compromise Resolution on War Powers, 19 Weekly
Comp. Pres. Doc. 1342 (Sept. 27, 1983) (emphasis added). See generally Note, The
Future of the War Powers Resolution, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1407, 1423-27 (1984) for the
background of the Lebanon resolution.
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In 1980, the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel affirmed
congressional power to place time limits on the President's use of troops to
conduct hostilities. 220 Assistant Attorney General Harmon wrote that the
sixty day limit on the use of U.S. armed forces by the President was
constitutional. For Harmon, "[t]he practical effect of the 60-day limit is to
shift the burden to the President to convince the Congress of the continuing
need for the use of our armed forces abroad. '22 1 That burden did not
unconstitutionally intrude upon the President's executive powers. Perhaps
even more importantly, Harmon recognized that "Congress may regulate the
'222
President's exercise of his inherent powers by imposing limits by statute.
This position is consistent with both Rehnquist's memorandum and Chief
Justice Marshall's opinion in Little that legislation may limit the power the
President may have as Commander in Chief.
Similarly, in 1993 Congress authorized President Clinton to use U.S.
armed forces in Somalia subject to both time limitations and severe
restrictions on their use. 22 3 Congress approved the use of U.S. armed forces
only for the purpose of protecting U.S. personnel and bases and securing the
free flow of supplies and relief operations in Somalia. 224 Moreover, Congress
provided a time limit for the President's use of troops until March 31, 1994,
after which the President was obligated to return to Congress for further
225
authorization.
As already noted, Congress limited the purpose, object, and uses of U.S.
armed forces in authorizing the President to take action against Iraq in 1991.
Rather than authorizing unlimited warfare against Iraq, Congress permitted
the President to use U.S. forces only for the purpose of implementing various
Security Council resolutions, thereby precluding certain military tactics and
strategies, including those that would have resulted in a military campaign
226
against Baghdad to oust Saddam Hussein.
The Congressional debate on whether to authorize President Clinton's air
campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999 is also instructive as to the scope of
22 0

4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 185, 196 (1980).

221 Id.

222 Id. Harmon claimed that the War Powers Resolution's use of the legislative veto

by concurrent resolution of both houses was unconstitutional, but that Congress could
regulate the President's inherent powers by means of a duly enacted statute.
223 Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-139,
§ 8151(b)(2)(B), 107 Stat. 1418, 1475-76 (1993).
224Id. at 1476.
225
Id. Congress also limited the President's power to determine who should
command U.S. forces on the ground providing that those forces "shall be under the
command and control of United States commanders" and not U.N. commanders. Id.
226 H.R. J. Res. 77, 102d Cong. (1991), Pub. L. No. 102-1, 105 Stat. 3. See supra p.
412, note 64.
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congressional power to impinge upon the Commander in Chief's choice of
military tactics. Clinton had initiated a bombing campaign in conjunction
with NATO forces against Serbia in response to Serbian human rights
violations in Kosovo without first obtaining congressional authorization. The
Senate voted relatively quickly to authorize the President to conduct limited
military operations: "military air operations and missile strikes in cooperation
with our NATO allies against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." 227 When
the House of Representatives debated the Senate Resolution more than a
month later, many Representatives believed that they should explicitly deny
the President the power to use ground forces in the Yugoslav conflict.
Congresspersons Tillie Fowler and William Goodling introduced a resolution
to prohibit the use of appropriated funds for the deployment of ground
elements of the U.S. armed forces in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
unless that deployment was specifically authorized by law. 22 8 The House
debated a series of resolutions at the same time, including one to declare war,
the Senate resolution authorizing the limited warfare, and the resolution
prohibiting the use of ground forces.
Virtually every member of Congress who participated in the debate
recognized that Congress had the constitutional authority to limit the use of
229
ground troops even if they authorized the President to conduct warfare.
Only a few representatives disputed the constitutionality of the resolution
even though it could have been read to prevent U.S. commanders from prepositioning tanks and military equipment, prohibit on the ground intelligence
gathering and the use of special forces, and impair commanders' ability to
gather intelligence necessary to prosecute the air war and obtain other critical
military information. 2 30 Despite a few members' concerns that the resolution
interfered with the President's commander in chief power by getting "into the
details of whether 'you can do this mission, but you can't do that
mission,' ' 23 1 the House voted.249-180 to approve the prohibition on the use
227 S. Con. Res. 21, 106th Cong. (1999), 145 CONG. REc. 7785 (1999) (emphasis

added).
228

H.R. Res. 1569, 106th Cong. (1999), 145 CONG. REc. 6, 7743 (1999).
229 145 CONG. REc. 7740 (1999) (remarks of Rep. Kolbe that he would vote to
authorize limited war, but prohibit the use of ground troops.); id. at 7741 (remarks of
Rep. Castle to same effect); id. at 7733 (remarks of Rep. Markey); id. at 7746 (remarks of
Rep. Andrews, recognizing that Congress has the constitutional power to tell the
President not to use ground troops, but that it is wrong to do so); id. at 7751 (remarks of
Rep. Spratt, same).
230 145 CONG. REc. 7736 (1999) (remarks of Rep. Bentsen setting forth limitation
imposed by bill); id. at 7729 (remarks of Mr. Spratt) (same); id. at 7751 (remarks of Rep.

Skelton) (same).
231 145 CONG. REc. 7787 (1999) (remarks of Rep. Sisisky); id. at 7744 (remarks of
Rep. King).
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of ground elements in the military campaign. 232 While the Senate Resolution
was ultimately defeated in the House, by a tie vote of 213-213, and therefore
neither that resolution nor the resolution prohibiting the introduction of
ground elements ever became law, Congress overwhelmingly agreed that it
had the authority to limit the manner and means by which the President can
conduct ongoing military campaigns.
Congress also can and has enacted statutes implementing various laws of
war treaties which regulate the tactics the President can deploy on the
battlefield. 233 For example, the War Crimes Act prohibits and makes criminal
grave breaches of the Geneva Convention as well as various articles of the
Annex to the Hague Convention IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land of 1907.234 The Act prohibits and criminalizes any attack on
towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings that are undefended; the use of
weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering; and the destruction or
seizure of enemy property unless such destruction is imperatively demanded
by the necessities of war, and requires the Executive to take all necessary
steps to spare buildings dedicated to religious and certain other civilian uses
in any siege or bombardment. In addition, the statute prohibits the military
from using weapons such as mines and booby traps in a manner contrary to
the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, BoobyTraps and Other Devices to kill or seriously injure civilians when the United
States ratifies that treaty. 235 Thus, in sum, Congress has exercised its power
to implement treaties governing the rules of war and to define offenses
against the law of nations, which restricts military commanders' discretion to
236
conduct warfare.
232 145 CONG. REC. 7756 (1999). Many members of Congress who voted to
authorize limited war also voted for the resolution prohibiting the introduction of ground
troops.
233 War Crimes Act, Pub. L. No. 104-192, § 2(a) (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2441 (2000)).
234 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (c)(2) (2000) (codifying Arts. 23, 25, 27, 28, Convention IV

Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with Annexed Regulations, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 227).
235 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(4) (2000).

236 Professor John Yoo argues that the "treatment of captured enemy soldiers" is an
area in which the President enjoys exclusive authority, yet dismisses the statutes that
Congress has enacted regulating the treatment of enemy soldiers throughout American
history. John Yoo, TransferringTerrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1183, 1201 (2004).
He discusses statutes criminalizing torture of enemy prisoners and nowhere disputes their
constitutionality, although he fails to recognize that such statutes clearly regulate the
"treatment of captured enemy soldiers," and therefore under Yoo's analysis should be
unconstitutional as an infringement of the President's exclusive authority over the
treatment of captured enemy soldiers. Id. at 1232-33. He claims that the congressional
power to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces"

2008]

COMMANDER IN CHIEFAND CONGRESS

In sum, recent history confirms the lessons set forth by the early leaders
of the Republic. As the Supreme Court recognized early on, Congress can
control the President's conduct of war by limiting his authorization "in place,
objects and in time." Congress has done so throughout our history.
III. CONCURRENT POWER OVER THE CONDUCT OF WAR

The history of congressional restrictions on the President's Commander
in Chief power to fight wars confirms that the Constitution grants Congress
substantial power to decide not only whether to initiate warfare, but how and
in what manner those authorized wars should be fought. But the Constitution
also accords the President substantial authority over the conduct of warfare.
Certain powers were designed to be exclusive to Congress or the President.
Only Congress can authorize and initiate warfare, with the sole exception
that the President can use force to respond to sudden attacks. Only Congress
can appropriate monies for the armed forces. The President was given the
exclusive power to command the armies. But for the most part, Congress and
the President were given concurrent powers over the conduct of warfare.
A. Defining and UnderstandingConcurrentPower
The concept of concurrent power in the area of foreign policy and warmaking has not been extensively analyzed, and confusion about it is
abundant. One reason for the confusion stems from Justice Jackson's wellknown Youngstown concurrence in which he set forth three broad situations
in which a President's power may be challenged: (1) "When the President
acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his
authority is at its maximum"; (2) "When the President acts in absence of
either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his
own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and
Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is
uncertain"; and (3) "When the President takes measures incompatible with
'23 7
the express or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb.
The confusion stems from Jackson's grouping of the concept of concurrent
authority together with areas in which the distribution of power is uncertain,
' 238
in his middle category, the "zone of twilight.

is likely limited to the discipline of U.S. troops, despite the lack of any textual reason to
so read that power and despite the fact that the early statutes enacted by Congress
explicitly addressed soldiers' treatment and detention of civilians and enemy soldiers. Id.
at 1202; see supra notes 148-49.
23 7
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635, 637 (1952).
238 Id. at 637.
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Justice Jackson's groupings have led to two conceptual fallacies. The
first is associating concurrent power with Jackson's second, middle tier.239
This association is inaccurate, because Jackson's three tiers refer to the
relationship between congressional and executive action and not the
respective powers of the branches. 24 0 Concurrent powers exist in all three of
Justice Jackson's categories. The President may act in conformity with
congressional will though he or she may possess concurrent ,power to act
stemming from the Constitution rather than statute. A court will undoubtedly
not reach, that constitutional question once it finds that the President has
statutory power to act. 24 1 So too, the President may have concurrent power
over a particular area, but acts unconstitutionally if the President's activities
conflict with the implied or express will of Congress.
The second, and more important, fallacy grew from lawyers and scholars
lumping together concepts of concurrent authority and uncertain authority,
which are distinct categories requiring different analysis. Where the
distribution of power is uncertain, one must analyze its proper distribution.
This involves a complex, often murky, case-specific analysis. Such an
analysis entails either line drawing by separating the branches' respective
authorities, or balancing the branches' functions to determine whether a
statute impermissibly interferes with Executive authority. However, when the
two branches have concurrent power, the distribution of power is not
uncertain. The sole question is that of determining congressional will.
The Department of Justice confuses and intermingles these two
concepts--concurrent power and powers of uncertain distribution-in its
memorandum "Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National
Security Agency Described by the President. '24 2 That memorandum claims
that absent AUMF authorization, the struggle against al Qaeda would fall
into "what Justice Jackson called 'a zone of twilight,' in which the President
and the Congress may have concurrent powers whose 'distribution is
243
uncertain. '"
The Department of Justice's reliance on Justice Jackson's teaching is
faulty because Jackson did not refer to concurrent power whose distribution
is uncertain. Rather, he stated there is a zone of twilight in which the
President and Congress "may have concurrent authority," or "in which the
239 See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 386 (1989) ("[W]e have
recognized the constitutionality of a 'twilight area' in which the activities of the separate
branches merge.").
24 0
See MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 15-16 (1990)
(explaining that usage of the term concurrentpower to refer to Jackson's middle tier, the
zone of twilight, is inaccurate).
241 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516-17 (2004).
242 LEGAL AUTHORITIES, supra note 3.
243 Id. at 11.
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distribution of power is uncertain." 244 The Justice Department's
memorandum suggests that even if Congress has concurrent power to
regulate intelligence gathering activities, one still must determine whether an
exercise of -this congressional power impermissibly interferes with the
Executive's authority. Justice Jackson said no such thing.
Perhaps the confusion can be attributed to giving different meanings to
the words "concurrent power." One could define the term loosely to mean
simply that Congress and the President have some power within the same
area. For example, one could say that Congress and the President have
"concurrent war powers," and mean that each branch was given some war
powers--Congress to declare war, the President to be Commander in
Chief-and that the distribution of these powers is uncertain.
That interpretation is not, however, the best reading of Justice Jackson's
admittedly opaque usage of the term concurrent, and it is not the definition I
use here. The definition of concurrent used here is that both branches have
the power to act upon the same subject. This definition is not only more
usable as a legal concept than the loose characterization of concurrent as
meaning that both branches have power in related, broad areas, but it is also
consistent with the common and accepted meaning of the word
"concurrent." 24 5
Yet another source of confusion is the intermingling of the terms
"independent power," "inherent power," "exclusive power," and "core
power," particularly when discussing foreign affairs power. 24 6 The
President's independent Commander in Chief power is often conflated with
an exclusive power or inherent, indefeasible power. To say that the President
has independent power stemming from the Constitution does not mean he has
exclusive authority. Rather it simply means that he has constitutional
authority to act in the absence of implied or express congressional
authorization. That does not tell us, however, whether Congress also has
independent power to act in this same area. Only where the President has the
exclusive power to act is Congress precluded from acting upon the same
subject matter. Where the two branches have concurrent power, it means that
they both have independent, but not exclusive, power to act upon the subject
area. But in a case of conflict the rule would seem clear. Where Congress has
the concurrent power to act, the President cannot act in opposition to the law
Congress enacts, irrespective of whether he also has the independent
244 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952).
245 WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2002) defines concurrent as

"taking cognizance of or having authority over the same subject matters."
246 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 646-47. Justice Jackson noted that "'[i]nherent'
powers, 'implied' powers, 'incidental' powers, 'plenary' powers, 'war' powers and
'emergency' powers are used, often interchangeably and without fixed or ascertainable
meanings." Id. at 647.
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authority to act.247 For the President must obey and enforce duly enacted
laws, and where the President and Congress have concurrent power to take
certain actions, Congress must have primacy in case of conflict.24 8 Indeed,
that is the express meaning of Justice Jackson's third category in
Youngstown; when

the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied
will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only
upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of
Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control
in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the
249
subject.
Where Congress is not so disabled it must have either the exclusive
power to act or concurrent authority to act. Only if Congress has no authority
to act can the President prevail.
For example, the Justice Department conflates the notion of independent
power and exclusive power in arguing that the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) would be unconstitutional if read to prohibit the
National Security Agency's (NSA) warrantless wiretapping program. The
Department of Justice argues that the President has inherent constitutional
247 Professor Henkin's well-known treatise on foreign affairs and the Constitution
refers to concurrent powers in a manner that must be different than that set forth here.
Professor Henkin writes that

Justice Jackson did not tell us, or offer a principle that might help us determine,
which powers are concurrent. Nor does the Jackson 'arithmetic' suggest which
branch prevails in case of conflict between them. The area of concurrent power
seems to involve principally Presidential pretensions where Congressional authority
is clear, which might suggest that Congress should usually prevail in case of
conflict, no matter which branch acted first.

Louis

HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTTruTioN 95 (2d ed.
1996). My definition of concurrent power postulates that both branches have legitimate
authority over the same area, and therefore, under Jackson's formulation in Youngstown,
Congress should always prevail when there is a conflict.
248 Professor Mark Rosen has recently questioned what he terms Justice Jackson's
"categorical congressional supremacy" assumption. Rosen, supra note 55. Jackson, of
course, did not state that presidential acts in violation of a statute are always
unconstitutional, but recognizes that such acts may be constitutional if Congress has no
power to act over a certain subject. For example, the President would not have to comply
with a statute requiring that the Speaker of the House of Representatives be appointed
Commander in Chief of the armed forces. But where Congress does have concurrent
power over a subject area, the constitutional text and basic separation of powers principle
that the President enforce the law strongly supports congressional supremacy where the
presidential acts conflict with a statute.
249 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637-38.
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authority to conduct warrantless searches as part of his "duty to protect the
Nation from armed attack." However, most of the precedents it cites stand
simply for the proposition that the President has some independent authority
to engage in warrantless wiretapping for national security purposes. They do
not hold that he has exclusive authority to do so irrespective of legislation
250
forbidding such conduct.
The only judicial decision the Justice Department cites that arguably
supports the claim that the President has an exclusive power to conduct war
is In re Sealed Case; yet, that decision also muddled and misused the term
inherent power.2 51 In In re Sealed Case, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court of Review asserted that the Fourth Circuit's decision in United States
v. Truong Dinh Hung "held that the President did have inherent authority to
intelligence
foreign
obtain
to
searches
warrantless
conduct
information .... We take for granted that the President does have that
authority and, assuming that is so, FISA could not encroach on the
President's constitutional power." 252 The Fourth Circuit in Truong simply
held that the President had independent constitutional authority to conduct
foreign intelligence wiretapping. However, the Truong court explicitly
disclaimed that the President had exclusive authority to preclude legislation
requiring warrants. The Court stated that the
imposition of a warrant requirement, beyond the constitutional
minimum.., should be left to the intricate balancing performed in the
course of the legislative process by Congress and the President. The
elaborate structure of the statute [the FISA, which had been enacted
subsequent to the surveillance involved in that case] demonstrates that the
formulate the standards which
political branches need great flexibility to...2 53
will govern foreign intelligence surveillance.
Simply because the President has some independent power to engage in
foreign intelligence surveillance that does not depend on legislation does not
mean that he has sole or exclusive power to do so. As the Fourth Circuit
recognized in Truong, Congress also has constitutional authority to regulate
intelligence gathering in time of war. As the Court noted in Hamdan,
whatever "independent power" the President may have does not allow him to
"disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war
254
powers, placed on his powers."
AuTHORrTIEs, supra note 3, at 9; see generally id. at 7-10.
251 LEGAL AUTHORrrIES, supra note 3, at 8 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d
717, 742 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002)).
250 LEGAL

252 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 742.
253 United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 914 n.4 (4th Cir. 1980).
254
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct.2749, 2774 n.23 (2006).
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The President's Article II independent power as Commander in Chief to
conduct warfare that is authorized by Congress has three relevant
components. The first is his or her power to control the conduct of military
campaigns in a duly authorized war. In the absence of any directive or
limitation from Congress, the President and his subordinates must decide the
tactics and strategies used to conduct military campaigns, subject to
255
constitutional or international law limitations.
Second, the President was given, in Hamilton's words, "a right to
command the military and naval forces of the nation. '2 56 The President or her
subordinates must actually give orders to the military during warfare. Though
Congress may decide that the President shall implement certain policies
during a war, it falls to the Executive to give orders carrying out those
policies. Congress does not send orders to the front, even general orders
directing commanders to seize or treat prisoners in a specified manner. That
is an Executive function. The second aspect of the power to command is the
President's control over his or her commanders. Congress cannot take
command itself, cannot appoint nor remove the general in charge of a
particular war or particular command; that task falls to the President, subject
to restraints imposed by the Constitution and Congress. 2 57
Finally, the President has the power as Commander in Chief to repel
sudden attacks. 2 58 That power provides the President with the authority in
peacetime to respond to attacks upon U.S. troops, citizens, or territory.259
That authority has been the subject of much controversy over the last half of
the twentieth century, as Presidents and their supporters read their power to
repel attacks as a broad mandate to defend U.S. national security wherever in
the world it was threatened. 260 While the debate over the Commander in
255 For example, the President's Commander in Chief power to conduct warfare may
in certain circumstances be restricted by the Bill of Rights, or by treaties of the United
States, and is also limited by international law. See Lobel, supra note 168, and sources
cited infra note 297.
2 56
THE FEDERALIST No. 69, supra note 9, at 470.
257 For example, the Appointments Clause of the Constitution provides that the
President's appointment of all officers of the army and navy is subject to confirmation by
the Senate, unless otherwise provided by law. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
258
See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
259 For example, Section 2 of the War Powers Resolution defined the Commander in
Chief's power to repel attacks as arising only "by attack upon the United States, its
territories or possessions, or its armed forces." Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c)(3)).
260 During the Vietnam War, the Executive branch argued that the President had the
unilateral power to send troops to Vietnam because in the modem context warfare
anywhere in the world might "impinge directly on the nation's security." Dep't of State,
Office of the Legal Adviser, The Legality of UnitedStates Participationin the Defense of
Viet Nam, 75 YALE L.J. 1085, 1101 (1965). For the contrary position that the Constitution
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Chief s repel sudden attack power has focused on the President's
constitutional authority to initiate warfare, the "repel attack" analysis also has
implications for the President's ability to conduct wars authorized by
Congress. As the congressional debate on the Cooper-Church Amendment in
1970 illustrates, once the President is conducting warfare, she has authority
to decide what tactics are to be used to protect troops already in the war zone
26 1
from enemy attacks.
These are the independent powers of the President as Commander in
Chief to conduct warfare authorized by Congress. However, only the second
power, the right to command, is an exclusive presidential power.
B. ConcurrentPowers and Alternative Frameworks
This Article's conclusion that Congress and the President have
concurrent power over the conduct of authorized warfare is echoed in a
recent two-part article by Professors David Barron and Martin S. Lederman
on the Commander in Chief power, which similarly concludes that the
President does not have an exclusive substantive power over the conduct of
military campaigns and warfare that Congress may not regulate. 262 While the
two articles' conclusions are similar, their methodological framework
somewhat differs. Barron and Lederman propound a core/periphery
dichotomy which analyzes whether the President's Commander in Chief
power to conduct military campaigns is a core, preclusive power of the
Executive branch, or rather a peripheral power which could be regulated by
Congress. To Barron and Lederman the "key constitutional question,
therefore, is which, if any, of the President's constitutional war powers are so
central to his performance of his role as the Commander in Chief as to
263
preclude Congress from regulating them."
In contrast, this Article focuses on the concept of concurrent power, and
asks not whether the Executive power at issue is central or peripheral, but the
related, yet analytically distinct, question of whether Congress and the
President have overlapping power in a particular area. That inquiry stems
only accords the President a narrow power to defend the country from attack, see S. REP.
No. 220 at 10-14 (1973); FISHER, supra note 20; Adler, supra note 20.

261 In the debate over including a proviso recognizing the President's power to
protect the Armed Forces of the United States, Senator John Cooper pointed out that the
powers being discussed "are essentially defensive to repel

attack, sudden and

impending ....
" Remarks of Sen. John Cooper on the Second Byrd Amendment,
reprinted in EUGENE DvoRIN, THE SENATOR WAR POWERS: DEBATE ON CAMBODIA FROM

THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 186 (1970).
262 Barron & Lederman, Framing the Problem, supra note 19; Barron & Lederman,
A ConstitutionalHistory, supra note 19.
263 Id.at 1099.
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directly from the metaphor Justice Jackson used to analyze conflicts between
Presidential action and legislative will in which the President "can rely only
upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of
Congress over the matter." 2 64 Under Jackson's Youngstown approach, the
President's power fluctuates based on whether Congress has independent,
overlapping, concurrent power over the matter. If Congress does, then that
power negates whatever independent power the President may have in case
of a conflict. 265 Only where Congress does not have concurrent power can
the President's independent constitutional authority trump or override a
conflicting statute.
Of course, the concurrent/sole power framework suggested here shares
an important feature with the Barron/Lederman core/periphery approach, in
that both require a determination of whether the particular Commander in
Chief power the President asserts is not merely an independent constitutional
power, but is preclusive. The core/periphery inquiry, however, has several
troubling features. First, the core/periphery terminology adds another set of
confusing concepts in an area which, as Jackson pointed out in Youngstown,
is already littered with a dizzying array of vague and ambiguous terms. The
question of whether any power is "so central" to the President's performance
of his role as Commander in Chief introduces into the war powers context the
much criticized formulation the Supreme Court utilized in Morrison v.
Olsen.266 Terms like "core" or "so central" add nothing to our understanding
of whether a Presidential power is in fact preclusive or not.
Second, and more importantly, the terms core and periphery are
misleading and do not capture or define the division between those areas of
Executive authority which are regulable by Congress and those that are not.
The core/periphery framework inappropriately conflates centrality with
exclusivity. 267 For a power might be a core or central (and those terms seem
26 4

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson,

J., concurring).
265
See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 55, at 1706-07, 1714 n.33 (asserting that the
common assumption is that Congress trumps when, pursuant to its constitutional powers,
it regulates on matters that also fall within the President's Commander in Chief powers).
266

LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 695-96 (3d ed. 1999)

(claiming that Morrison has drawn severe and widespread criticism and quoting Justice
Scalia's dissent that the "so central" test is "not analysis; it is ad hoc judgment"); Stephen
L. Carter, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term: Comment: The Independent Counsel Mess,
102 HARv. L. REv. 105, 132 (1988) ("This particular balancing test, moreover, seems
particularly shaky. The Court offers no standards for deciding how much intrusion is too
much....").
267 WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 506 (3d ed. 2002) (defining "core" as
either "the central or often foundational part of a body," or perhaps more relevantly in
this context, "the part [as of an individual, a class, an entity] that is basic, essential, vital
or enduring as distinct from the incidental or transient")
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to be used interchangeably by Barron and Lederman) Executive authority in
the sense that the power might be important, vital, critical, or even essential
to the Executive and not peripheral or incidental, but nevertheless still be
regulable by the legislature because Congress was given an equally core or
central power to provide a check on Executive action. Conversely, a
President's power, such as the pardon power, may be exclusive and
nonregulable by Congress as a structural and textual matter even if it were
268
not deemed central to the functioning of the Executive branch.
The Commander in Chief's power to conduct or direct military
campaigns is precisely an authority which should be viewed as an important,
yet not exclusive, Presidential power. The function of deciding on military
tactics and strategy is central and not peripheral to a commander's wartime
role. Yet, as Part II demonstrates, Congress was given its own "core" war
powers precisely to check the Commander in Chief's important and
independent power to conduct warfare that Congress has authorized. "Core,"
"central," and "peripheral" thus have the potential to mislead because those
terms seem to focus on importance, an analytically different concept than
exclusive.
The terms "concurrent power" and "sole power" capture the different
kinds of authority more accurately than the terms "core," "central," or
"periphery." Where both Congress and the President have concurrent
authority to regulate, the President cannot disregard the legislative will
irrespective of whether the power Congress is regulating might be seen as
central to the President's functions. At the opposite end of the spectrum,
where the President has sole or preclusive power to act, Congress is, in
Jackson's words, "disabled" from acting.
Third, and perhaps most important, to focus the separation of powers
inquiry on whether a power is so central to the President's Commander in
Chief power frames the inquiry from an exclusively executive perspective.
One could equally ask whether the congressional legislation is based on a
power provided to Congress explicitly in the Constitution or one central to
the Congress's legislative power.269 From that perspective, the congressional
powers to declare war, issue letters of marque and reprisal, regulate army and
navy, make rules for captures at land and sea, and to raise armies, certainly
are explicit, "core" congressional powers that define and limit Executive
268

See Pub. Citizen v. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 485-87 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,

concurring) (arguing that it is improper to determine level of importance or centrality if
text of the Constitution gives an exclusive power to the President).
269 See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, Congress, the Commander-in-Chief and the
Separation of Powers After Hamdan, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 933, 96263 (2007) ("Where Congress is acting pursuant to a direct textual grant of authority, to
conclude that the President may nevertheless disable Congress from regulating his
conduct is to subvert the most fundamental structural principles of constitutional law.").
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power to wage warfare. 27 0 Indeed, once one starts from the framework of
congressional authority, one could logically conclude that Congress can
control virtually everything, including most Presidential powers thought to
be exclusive. 27 1 One need not, however, take that position (and this Article
does not-for the President's pardon and veto authority and position as
Commander in Chief of the armed forces are exclusive 2 72) to recognize that
congressional powers are quite broad and encompass many, if not most, of
the textual powers granted to the President. The proper framework for
determining whether the President has exclusive power over a certain subject
matter is not whether the asserted authority "is central to the performance of
his role," or whether it is a core or peripheral power, but rather whether this
is an area that Congress does and should have authority over. That is the
thrust of Jackson's important insight that the President's power in case of
270

To the extent that Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Public Citizen, 491
U.S. at 467, 482-89 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (1989), is read to support the position that
Congress cannot constitutionally regulate an explicit Presidential power granted by the
Constitution, the opinion is clearly in error. There are many areas of authority-such as
the conduct of warfare-where the Constitution's text explicitly grants both Congress
and the President authority to act. Justice Kennedy's opinion does not contemplate such
textually based concurrent power. He only directly addresses two types of conflicts
between Congress and the President. In his first example, the President's assertion of
power is based merely on the general grant to the President of the "executive power," in
which case the Court uses a "balancing approach"; in his second grouping of cases, the
"explicit text commits the power at issue to the exclusive control of the President," in
which case any congressional interference is intolerable. Id. at 484-85. Barron and
Lederman and some other commentators read Kennedy to preclude statutory interference
with any independent, enumerated Article II power. Barron & Lederman, supra note 19,
at 741 n. 164. However, Kennedy always conditions his analysis on his reading of the
textual provision as committing the power at issue to the "exclusive" or "sole" control of
the President. His opinion could thus be read as erroneously conflating independent
textual power with exclusive power, or more narrowly concluding (erroneously) that the
appointment power is exclusive and cannot be regulated. Id. at 729. But, most
importantly, Kennedy simply does not contemplate a clash of congressional and
executive authority where both branches base their asserted authority on the
Constitution's explicit text, a clash that exists in the area of controlling the conduct of
warfare and military campaigns.
271 Charles L. Black, Jr., The Working Balance of the American Political

Departments, I HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 13, 14-16 (1974).
272 Even with respect to Commander in Chief and veto power, Congress has the
theoretical ability to completely negate Presidential authority. There is no dispute that
Congress could, if it wanted, virtually eliminate the President's Commander in Chief
authority by refusing to provide for an army for him to command and provide rules for
the mobilization of state militias which only permitted those militias to be called into
service when the United States itself was invaded. So, too, as Professor Charles Black
observed, even the President's veto power could be negated if Congress adopted a rule of
automatically voting to override all vetoes. Black, supra note 271, at 15-16.
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conflict with Congress can only be supported "by any remainder of executive
power after subtraction of such powers as Congress may have over the
'273
subject.
The determination of whether Congress and the President have
concurrent power over a particular subject area requires answering several
questions. First, does the text of the Constitution indicate that both Congress
and the President were to have concurrent authority in that area? Second,
does according Congress authority over a particular subject matter fulfill a
functional need to check the accumulation of excessive authority in the
Executive? 274 Third, are there other strong structural reasons that power over
a specific area should not be divided by drawing subject matter lines but by
some other practical principle? 2 75 Finally, does the history of the drafting and
ratification of the Constitution, as well as the subsequent history of its
implementation over the past two centuries, indicate that this is an area where
the two branches share concurrent power?
As this Article has demonstrated, answers to those questions strongly
support congressional concurrent power over the conduct of warfare and
military campaigns. As the Framers wisely recognized, wartime poses a
substantial danger of executive aggrandizement of power, requiring that the
legislature be accorded substantial authority to check that potential threat.
The text of the Constitution therefore explicitly grants Congress broad
authority not only over the initiation of warfare, but also over the regulation

273 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (emphasis added). The Court's formulation in Hamdan that "[the
President] may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own
war powers, placed on his powers," Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2774 n.23
(2006), follows Jackson as articulating the question as whether Congress has power of the
subject. As Barron and Lederman point out, the Court conditions congressional exercise
of power with the word "proper," but the question of whether Congress' exercise of
power has been proper cannot be reduced to the question of whether the area Congress is
regulating is central to the President's role. Moreover, as Professor Mark Cohen points
out, if the footnote is read the way Barron and Lederman read it, the Court's footnote in
Hamdan only tautologically recites that Congress trumps when it properly trumps. Cohen,
supra note 55, at 1714 n.33.
274 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380-81 (1989) (describing checks
and balances as a motivating principle of separation of powers).
275 Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 760, 772 (1996) (Congress was not
granted an exclusive power to determine military punishments because the necessity of
balancing efficient military discipline, popular control of a standing army and the rights
of soldiers led the Framers to perceive the risks "inherent in assigning the task to one part
of the government to the exclusion of another." Congressional power to promulgate rules
and regulations is therefore shared with the President whose duties as Commander in
Chief "require him to take responsible and continuing action to superintend the
military .... ).
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of the armed forces, the rules for capturing the enemy, and the raising and
supporting of armed forces.
Moreover, Professor Charles Black's general insight into the working
balance of American government applies with even greater force to the
specific interaction between Congress's war powers and the President's
Commander in Chief power during wartime. Black noted that the
fundamental working balance of our government is achieved by the
Constitution's textual grant of most formal power to Congress, the branch of
government structurally unsuited to exercise power, while the President is
clothed with little exclusive textual power but is ideally structured for the
exercise of initiative and vigor in administration. 2 76 So long as the President
recognizes that Congress has broad textual power and Congress exercises
that power sufficiently to provide a check on Executive adventurism, the
Executive's practical exercise of substantial power provides a working
balance in government. That the Presidency is structured to provide the
initiative and energy to prosecute a war authorized by Congress is therefore
balanced with a Congress which is unsuited structurally to exercise wartime
decision-making but is nonetheless accorded broad textual power to check
and limit the President's conduct of war if it chooses to do so.
In addition, there are strong structural reasons for not dividing
congressional and presidential power over the conduct of warfare by means
of drawing subject area lines, but rather by a more practical division of
power which recognizes that timing and initiative is the more effective
organizer of power in this area. Third, the text of the Constitution clearly
supports the two branches' concurrent, overlapping authority over the
conduct of warfare. Finally, as Part II has demonstrated, the history of the
drafting, ratification and subsequent two-century practice of the political
branches in conducting warfare demonstrates that this is an area where both
branches have shared concurrent power to determine the strategy and tactics
that the United States utilizes when it engages in armed conflict.
C. Drawing the Lessons of History
Congress's broad concurrent power with the President over the conduct
of warfare is demonstrated by the history recounted in Part II. Congress and
the Supreme Court have read the Article I Declare War and Letter of Marque
and Reprisal Clauses to permit Congress to authorize unlimited war or a
limited, partial war in which the President's powers as Commander in Chief
are restricted by the terms of the authorization. As that Part demonstrated,
Congress can and has limited the forces the President can deploy, permitting
only the use of naval forces or only an air war. Therefore, it could also
276 Black, supra note 271, at 17-18.
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authorize warfare but permit the President to use only airpower, only
conventional weapons, or only a certain number of army divisions and no
more.
Congress has used its war authorization power to define and limit the
objects and purposes for which warfare may be waged in ways that
substantially restrict the President's tactical flexibility. The historical record
abounds with examples of such wartime limitations. Congress limited its first
authorization to use force against France in 1798 to taking reprisals against
French ships that had attacked our ships; it limited the 1991 Gulf War
authorization to kicking Iraq out of Kuwait and not removing the Iraqi
regime; it limited the objects and purposes of the use of force in both
Lebanon and Somalia to substantially restrict the tactics and forces the
2 77
President could deploy.
Congress has also restricted the time period and duration of its
authorization of force. The War Powers Resolution is an example of a
general limitation; the authorizations of the Somalia and Lebanon troop
deployments are more particular limitations. In those latter authorizations,
Congress has in essence promulgated rules of deployment by severely
restricting how the President could use the force deployed.
Congress has normally imposed these restrictions in its initial
authorization, but there is no logical, textual, nor historical reason to limit
congressional power to the onset of warfare. Congress can, of course,
withdraw its authorization totally and enact another authorization which
provides the President with more limited authority to conduct warfare.
Congress could also simply amend the original authorization by providing an
express limitation on the President's authority to conduct a war, which
Congress essentially did when it restricted funding for the introduction of
ground troops into Laos and Thailand in 1970. In short, the power to
authorize limited war, not full scale warfare, does not terminate at the
beginning of hostilities, but is a continuing option that is within Congress's
power.
Congress has also relied extensively on its other war powers to limit the
Commander in Chief's discretion in prosecuting a war. It has used its power
to make rules for the government and regulation of land and naval forces to
enact articles of war governing the permissible conduct of soldiers during
wartime and peacetime. It has employed its power to make rules concerning
captures on land and water to determine which enemy or merchant ships the
military can capture in wartime and which it cannot, which enemy property
shall be seized and confiscated and which shall not, and how prisoners of war
will be detained and treated. Congress has relied on its power to define and
punish offenses against the law of nations to provide that certain military
277 See generally supra Part II, pp. 415-45.

OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 69:391

tactics shall be impermissible war crimes, such as the bombing of
undefended towns. Congress has invoked its power to grant letters of marque
and reprisal, not only to initiate hostilities short of declared war, but also to
authorize the President to employ privateers for limited purposes and with
limited instructions against the enemy. It has relied on its power to raise and
support armies and to provide and maintain a navy to issue detailed
instructions to the President as to which and how many soldiers and sailors
will serve on naval vessels and to impose restrictions on how the President
may use the army in conducting warfare. And Congress has the power under
the Necessary and Proper Clause to enact any law that is useful or convenient
to execute any of its specifically mentioned powers under the broad reading
2 78
of that Clause set forth by the Supreme Court.
Some have argued that the historical record supports not only rejecting
any Presidential claim of preclusive Commander in Chief wartime authority,
but also denying the President independent substantive constitutional power
to conduct warfare that is authorized by Congress. 279 This reading of history
would not find any Presidential power to conduct war grounded in an
independent constitutional authority as Commander in Chief, but would
derive such presidential power exclusively from statutes authorizing warfare.
The extent of presidential power to conduct warfare would, according to this
perspective, be determined solely by legislation authorizing warfare.
The historical record contains some support for this perspective. The
Framers' intent in naming the President Commander in Chief was clearly to
provide for civilian control of the military and to ensure that one person, and
not an unwieldy legislative body or someone appointed by Congress, would
direct, order, and supervise the military. That intent is not inconsistent with
viewing the President's substantive power to conduct warfare as stemming
from, and not independent of, legislative enactment. The history of the
Commander in Chief's powers under British law also suggests that her
powers came from the statute and not the Constitution itself. That all of our
declarations of war provide the President with the authority to use the entire
army and navy to fight the enemy suggests that the declaration of war itself
might not have sufficed to invoke the President's Commander in Chief
280
power.
Statements by various Republican Senators during the Civil War debate
on the Confiscation Act that there is "not a syllable in the Constitution
conferring on the President war powers," and that the President can conduct
war "only in the manner and in the mode" prescribed by Congress, also
support a position that the Commander in Chief Clause accorded the
2 78
279

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
See Adler, supra note 20, at 526.
2 80
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 124, at 2063-64.
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President only a command function, but no independent substantive
power.2 8 1 So too, Chief Justice Marshall's statement in Talbot v. Seeman that
the whole powers of war are vested in Congress and that, therefore, "the acts
of that body can alone be resorted to as our guides" 2 82 in determining
whether a capture was lawful also suggests that the extent of the President's
power as Commander in Chief is determined solely by legislative
authorization. Furthermore, in Brown v. United States, Marshall suggested
that neither a declaration of war nor a broad authorization of force activate a
2 83
Commander in Chiefs power to execute the laws of war.
The Brown Court recognized that a declaration of war gave the United
States the rights which war confers, but argued that it did not automatically
empower the Executive to implement such war measures. Marshall held that
the congressional power to make rules concerning captures on land and water
was an independent substantive power, not included in the declaration of
war. Therefore, the declaration did not authorize the President to seize enemy
property in the United States. Indeed, Marshall notes that Congress's
independent authorization for the detention of enemy aliens, and for "the safe
keeping and accommodation ofprisoners of war," "authorizations that were
separate from its declaration of war, affords a strong implication that [the
President] did not possess those powers by virtue of the declaration of
war."

284

Nonetheless, both text and history strongly suggest that the President as
Commander in Chief is accorded nonpreclusive but independent
constitutional authority to conduct war once Congress has authorized
warfare. That seems to be the best reading of the Constitutional Convention's
change in the text of Congress's Article I powers from "make" to "declare"
war. As the history of that amendment suggests, one purpose of the change in
language was to accord the President at least some independent power to
conduct wars once they were authorized. Moreover, the Supreme Court has
on various occasions recognized that the President has some independent
constitutional power over the military in the absence of legislation to the
contrary, 285 and judicial precedent and executive practice subsequent to the

281 See statements of Sens. Lyman Trumbull and John Sherman quoted supra,
pp. 435-36.
282 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801).
2 83

Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 126 (1814).
284 Id.at 126 (emphasis added).
285 Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 767, 772 (1996); Swaim v. United States,
165 U.S. 533, 557-58 (1897).
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war of 1812 are in tension with Chief Justice Marshall's decision in
286

Brown.

To the extent that the courts and Congress accord broad statutory
authorization to the President to conduct war, the question of whether the
President's substantive power to decide on wartime tactics and strategies is
based on the Commander in Chief Clause or derives from statutory authority
may be of little practical significance. But as a theoretical and historical
matter, it makes more sense to accord the President independent, but
concurrent, power to conduct wars authorized by Congress.
One might also argue that the historical record supports several narrow
exceptions to the broad concurrent power of Congress to regulate the conduct
of war. First, Congress has not attempted to direct troop movements in battle,
to provide battle plans, to order troops to attack or retreat, or to require an
attack at a particular location. While Congress has instructed the President as
to the geographic scope of his authority to attack the enemy and how many
overall troops he may use, it has not told him particularly where he must
attack or how many troops he must use in such an attack.
Congress has not done so because it has recognized that it would be
impractical and unwise to manage such details as the army's battlefield
movements and plans, not because it lacks constitutional power to do so.
Congress certainly would never be capable of meeting and deciding when the
army should retreat or advance, and the need for secrecy, unity of command,
and flexibility in war generally preclude congressional legislation in this
area. But there is no sound theoretical distinction between the powers
Congress possesses and has exercised and the direction of and planning for
battles. While Congress has not (and could not) command the army, it can
and has placed numerous restrictions on how the army can engage in combat.
Therefore, any purported narrow exception based on directing troop
movement or providing battle plans is unwarranted.
Congress could authorize the use of force against another nation yet
restrict that authorization to launching an attack against a particular town,
and, indeed, in the Lebanon authorization it restricted the use of U.S. forces
to Beirut. Congress could have used its funding power to restrict the use of
authorized funds during World War II against any beachhead in France
except those in northern France. Or it could use its funding power to limit the
number of divisions for which funds could be used to implement the attack.
None of these restrictions would be fundamentally or theoretically different
from what Congress historically has done. While it would be impractical and
286 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 124, at 2093-94. For example, during the Civil
War, Lincoln greatly expanded the President's powers and initiated a blockade and
seizure of vessels without relying on congressional authorization, a position upheld by
the Supreme Court. As one noted writer argues, "The Supreme Court in effect rejected
much of what Marshall had written [in Brown]." HENKIN, supranote 247, at 104.
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probably foolish for Congress to enact any of these types of restrictions,
this does not mean that it would be unconstitutional for it to do so. Congress
has many unchallenged powers to enact foolish or unwise measures.
One might argue, however, that the potential danger that Congress could
enact impractical, and unduly restrictive legislation controlling the movement
of troops in battle supports a constitutional rule that accords the President
sole power in this area, even if the line that was drawn was somewhat vague
or logically indefensible.
That argument fails for two reasons. First, such a line is unnecessary.
Congress has never interfered with battle plans or troop movements in the
course of battle, even during the Civil War when congressional
intermeddling in military matters was at its height. There is no reason to
believe that Congress is even remotely likely to do so in the future, or that it
is even capable of doing so. The line drawing would not be in response to a
real problem, but a speculative, highly remote hypothetical. Important
constitutional distinctions ought not be based on imaginary problems.
Worse still, the purely speculative danger that Congress might in the
future interfere with battle plans or troops movements in the course of
warfare must be balanced against the very real and present danger that
Presidents will use an exclusive power over troop movements to expand their
power dramatically at Congress's expense.
Modem Presidents have done just that. They have sought to expand their
narrow constitutional power to repel sudden attacks into a power to introduce
U.S. troops into hostilities anywhere in the world where, in the President's
opinion, the United States' national interests are threatened. They have
argued that the President's narrow power to protect our troops precludes
Congress from limiting offensive actions that significantly expand a war.
The current administration has gone further, arguing that the President's
power to direct the movement of troops precludes Congress from absolutely
forbidding torture, or warrantless spying against Americans. The potential for
abuse of a narrow but theoretically expandable rule is enormous, everpresent, and demonstrated by history.
Congress has also generally not restricted the President's power to repel
attacks on American troops. 2 88 But the President's power to repel attacks

287 See Statement of Sen. Benjamin Wade, supra note 186 and accompanying text,
p. 436.

288

See Cooper-Church Amendment, Lebanon authorization, Pub. L. No. 91-652,
§ 2(6) (1971); Somalia authorization, supra note 223 and accompanying text, and the
Emergency Supplement Appropriations for the Fiscal Year ending September 30, 2007
providing funds for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, H.R. 1591, 110th Cong. § 1904(F)
(2007), permitting the Secretary of Defense to deploy United States armed forces after
the 180 day period of redeployment from Iraq for, inter alia, protecting American
diplomatic facilities and American citizens, including members of the Armed Forces.
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should be viewed as an independent power that permits the Executive to act
with speed and flexibility in the absence of congressional authority, but that
Congress has the right to regulate and limit that power.
The President's power is only the emergency power to repel an attack
and is therefore by necessity a temporary one to be exercised until Congress
meets to decide what to do. 2 89 Indeed, the War Powers Resolution limited the
President's emergency power to use troops to repel an attack to 60 days
unless Congress is physically unable to meet or the President certifies that
unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed
Forces requires an extension for no more than 30 days. 2 90 Thus, Congress has
limited the time during which the President could utilize such "repel attack"
authority, and could also impose advance temporal limitations in specific
situations.
So too, Congress could also use its funding power and rules and
regulation power to restrict the manner in which the President could respond.
For example, legislation that provided that the President should not use
nuclear weapons to respond to a Soviet attack on American forces in Europe
during the Cold War would be within the clear power of Congress to make
rules for the army despite its limitation on the President's power to repel
attacks. Similarly, a hypothetical proviso that no funds provided to the
Department of Defense could be used to attack China during the Korean War
would be constitutional under Congress's spending power and declare war
power even though it would have limited the President's authority to respond
to a Chinese surprise attack on U.S. forces engaged in combat in Korea.
Nevertheless, Congress might have concluded that the dangers of wider war
in Asia were so enormous that the safer course would be to limit our
response to a Chinese attack on U.S. forces. Indeed Congress has limited the
permissible tactics that the President may use to respond to attacks on
American troops by enacting rules and regulations for the military and
statutes such as the War Crimes Act. More generally, as Senator Jacob Javits,
an important sponsor of the War Powers Resolution, noted in the Senate
debate on the Cooper-Church Amendment, the decision as to how to respond
to attacks and protect American troops often requires a balancing of the lives
of the soldiers on the front lines with the potential loss of many lives in an
escalation of war-a determination that Javits felt was for Congress to
make. 29 1
289 In this way, the President's power is similar in structure and intent to the power
reserved to individual nations under the U.N. Charter to exercise their right of selfdefense "until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
290 War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (2000).
291 See THE SENATE'S WAR POWERS, supra note 214, at 190-91.
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Finally, as already discussed, Congress has not and could not
constitutionally claim a right to appoint itself or someone else besides the
President to command the armed forces and give it orders. While Congress
has restricted who the President can appoint and has imposed rules as to the
chain of command, 292 the sole means for Congress to remove the President
as First General and Admiral of the Armed Forces is impeachment.
C. Concurrent Power Over Warfare: A Sequential, Non Horizontal
View of Separationof Powers
The President's power as Commander in Chief to conduct war is best
understood as a concurrent power shared with Congress but subordinate to
congressional authority. The Commander in Chief's power to direct U.S.
military forces in wartime is shared with Congress's panoply of war powers,
and both institutions can take actions in the same subject area. As
Congressmen Otis, Gallatin, and others argued in the 1790s,293 and Senator
Trumbull and his Republican colleagues argued in 1862,294 the President
could exercise his Commander in Chief power in the absence of
congressional direction. Similarly, Chief Justice Marshall suggested in Little
v. Barreme295that the President might have independent power to seize ships
traveling from enemy ports in wartime, but Congress could limit that power.
Or as Justice Story argued in dissent in Brown v. United States, where there
is "no act of the legislature defining the powers, objects or mode of warfare,"
the President has the power to act according to the law of nations.
"If... such acts are disapproved by the legislature, it is in their power to
narrow and limit the extent to which the rights of war shall be exercised; but
until such limit is assigned, the [E]xecutive must have all the right[s] of
modem warfare vested in him.... ",296
The President has independent power stemming from his Article II
Commander in Chief power to take actions he or she believes necessary in
conducting hostilities authorized by Congress, so long as those actions are
not inconsistent with constitutional restrictions and international law. 297 The
292 While the history of these restrictions is beyond the scope of this Article, see
generally WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 65, at 87-104; Hartzman, supra note 65, at
182.
293

See supra pp. 427-29.

294

See supra p. 435.
295 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
296 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 149 (1814).
297 The President's independent constitutional power must be exercised consistently
and not in derogation of the laws of war. Lobel, supra note 168. JORDAN PAUST,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 169-73, 487-90, 492-95, 856-61

(2d ed. 2003); Koh, supra note 7, at 1155-58. But see Robert Delahunty and John Yoo,
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nature of warfare, which requires speed, secrecy, flexibility, and unity of
action, dictates that the President have the power to act independently of
Congress and not be required to await instructions or laws enacted by an
unwieldy legislative body. Nonetheless, the functional need to provide a
check on the Commander in Chiefs wartime power requires that the
President's power be independent, but not exclusive or primary. Congress, if
it so chooses, can exercise its concurrent power to preclude or override
presidential action to the contrary.
The grant of concurrent war powers to Congress and the President is not
unusual in the United States. Although the Constitution explicitly grants
Congress the power to establish rules and regulations for the army, it does
not exclude the President from also exercising independent power to
establish rules for the military. Presidents have often exercised such
independent authority. 298 As the Supreme Court said in Loving v. United
States,299 Congress "exercises a power of precedence over, not exclusion of,
Executive authority." The Loving Court noted that congressional plenary
power to establish rules for the army co-exists with the President's
independent duty as Commander in Chief "to take responsible and
continuing action to superintend the military, including the courtsmartial. '30 0 Both Congress and the President thus have jurisdiction over the
same subject matter. 30 1 That the President has independent power stemming
from his Commander in Chief power means that he can act independently of
congressional authorization, not in disregard of it.
Constitutional power to conduct warfare, according to this view of
concurrent authority, is not divided between the branches based on a line
between certain subjects amenable to congressional regulation and other
Executive Power v. InternationalLaw, 30 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 73 (2000) for

contrary view. In addition, the Bill of Rights precludes the President from taking certain
actions, and he does not have broad Commander in Chief power to take certain actions in
the domestic sphere. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 644
(1952).
298
WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 27 (2d ed. 1920) ("[The
President's] function as Commander-in-Chief authorizes him to issue... such orders and
directions as are necessary and proper to ensure order and discipline in the army.").
299 517 U.S. 748, 767 (1996) (citing United States v. Eliason, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 291,
301 (1842)).
300517 U.S. at 772. In Swain v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the
President had independent Commander in Chief power to convene a court martial without
statutory authority. The Court approvingly quoted a Senate report that the President
possessed this power "in the absence of legislation expressly prohibitive." 165 U.S. 553,
557-58 (1897).
30 1
See G. NORMAN LIEBER, REMARKS ON ARMY REGULATIONS AND EXECUTIvE
REGULATIONS IN GENERAL 16 (1898) (Lieber also points out there is no clear line

separating the President's constitutional authority in this area from that of Congress).

COMMANDER IN CHIEFAND CONGRESS

2008]

subjects in the exclusive province of the President. Rather, the practical
division of power is sequential, not horizontal. This distribution of power is
based on the practical reality of according the President initiative and
flexibility to act quickly in the face of what often is a rapidly changing
wartime political and military reality which the President is best equipped to
respond to, yet also according Congress the power to check and limit
presidential initiative both before and after the Executive acts. The President
has the power to initiate, while Congress has a more deliberative reactive
power as well as the power to condition and limit presidential power before
30 2
engaging in hostilities.
Alexander Hamilton and James Madison discussed this notion 30of3
concurrent power in their famous Helvidius and Pacificus debates.
Hamilton wrote that although only Congress could decide whether the
country could go to war, "the Executive in the exercise of its constitutional
powers, may establish an antecedent state of things which ought to weigh in
the legislative decisions. From the division of the Executive Power there
30 4
results, in reference to it, a concurrentauthority, in the distributed cases."
Madison did not disagree with Hamilton. The Executive could not
impose "a constitutional obligation on the legislative decisions," but could
create an antecedent state of things that would have "an influence on the
expediency of this or that decision in the opinion of the legislature." 30 5 To
Madison, "[i]n this sense the power to establish an antecedent state of things
is not contested. '30 6 For both Madison and Hamilton, concurrent authority
gave the President authority to act before the legislature did, but could not
30 7
control or have primacy over legislative action.
Ironically, the chief expositors of concurrent powers as sequential in the
war powers area thus far have been proponents of Executive power.
Adherents of strong presidential power have argued that the President and

302 Michael J. Glennon, The Constitutional Power of the United States Senate to
Condition Its Consent to Treaties, 67 Cl-.-KENT L. REv. 533, 561 (1991). Treaty
Termination: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on ForeignRelations, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 311 (1979) (testimony of Professor Abram Chayes).
303 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, PACIFICUS No. 1 (1793), reprintedin 15 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON (Harrold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1969); JAMES
MADISON, HELVIDIUS No. 3 (1793), reprintedin 15 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 10203 (Thomas A. Mason et al. eds., 1984).
304

PACIFIcUS No. 1, supra note 303, at 42.

305 HELviDus No.3, supra note 303, at 102-03.
306 Id.at 102.

307 For an interesting and illuminating discussion of this debate, see Willam R.

Casto, Helvidius and PacificusReconsidered,28 N. KY. LAW REv. 612, 630-35 (2001).
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Congress have concurrent power to initiate hostilities. 308 These advocates
claim that the President may act pursuant to his authority as Commander in
Chief to seize the initiative to wage war, subject to congressional control
309
over funding.
While these advocates of Executive power apparently understand the
concept of concurrent power set forth here, they have misapplied it to the
area of the initiation of warfare. The Constitutional design is clear. The
President was not to have any power to initiate hostilities, but only the
limited power to reply to surprise attacks. This contrasts sharply with the
elaborate war powers Congress is given to control the conduct of war. The
Framers made clear that Congress, and not the President, is the branch with
the sole authority to initiate hostilities, but that once war was initiated by
Congress, the President and Congress would have concurrent authority over
its conduct.
As a practical matter, the President's command function derived from the
Commander in Chief Clause means that he or she has the initiative to make
what some scholars have termed "real time" wartime decisions as to the
conduct of military campaigns and battlefield operations. 310 Congress cannot
interfere with the command function by establishing a congressional
committee or appointing someone besides the President to make such
decisions. But Congress can, and has exercised its substantive war powers to,
limit the options the President can entertain in deciding how to wage warfare,
or to restrict, discontinue, or overturn Presidential wartime policies or
decisions that it disagrees with.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Framers of the Constitution intended that Congress have substantial
power to control the conduct of warfare it has authorized. The consistent
history of congressional restrictions confirms that the Constitution grants
Congress concurrent power to decide not only whether to initiate warfare, but
how and in what manner those authorized wars should be fought.
Accordingly, the Constitution sensibly accords the President considerable
flexibility and discretion to prosecute a war, but permits Congress to

308 Yoo, War and the ConstitutionalText, supra note 104, at 1683; Eugene Rostow,
Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 TEX. L. REV. 833, 870-71 (1972).
309
Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1144-45 (D.D.C. 1990) (citing Justice
Department memorandum in support of Motion to Dismiss). See also Who Can Declare
War?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1990, Opinion, at 26 (quoting Justice Department's
argument in court).
3 10
Debate (Testimony of John Norton Moore), supra note 24, at 31; Raven-Hansen
& Banks, supra note 45, at 914.
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maintain the ultimate authority to decide whether the President's policies and
strategies are those the nation should follow.

